Highlights
– Resolution of Kurdish concerns postponed
– Elections scheduled for 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces
– Minority proportional representation will be ensured
– Increase in intra-Shia violence anticipated
Iraq’s three member presidential council formally approved the passage of the Iraq Provincial Elections Law on October 8, 2008. The first draft of the Provincial Elections Law was vetoed by President Jalal Talibani, the Kurdish representative on Iraq’s presidential council, because it included a clause mandating equal representation for Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds on Kirkuk’s provincial council (Previous Report). As a result, the new provincial elections law shelves debate concerning proportional representation in the provinces comprising the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)—Irbil, Dahdouk, and Sulimanya—and in Kirkuk while allowing elections in the remaining 14 Iraqi provinces to move forward. Elections in the three Kurdish provinces and in Kirkuk are scheduled to occur before March 31, 2009. In the meantime, the Iraqi government has agreed to submit the divisive issue of the governance of Iraq’s oil rich Kirkuk to an independent commission for further consideration.
Though the new Provincial Elections Law met with the approval of Iraq’s Kurdish representatives, the road to provincial elections will not be smooth. An increase in demonstrations by Iraqi minorities, who are united in their opposition to the removal of mandated proportional representation for minorities on provincial councils, and an increase in targeted violence between the dominant Shia parties—the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Sadr Movement—is anticipated in the near-term.
Article 50—Minority Representation
Iraq’s Christian, Turkmen and Yazidi minorities united in two weeks of protests against the removal of Article 50 from the Provincial Elections Law. The Article in question legislated quotas for proportional minority representation on provincial councils. The article was removed as a result of debate concerning Turkmen representation. Iraq’s presidential council was opposed to the article’s removal, but rather than rejecting the law outright, opted to pass the current version and recommended to parliament Article 50 be reinstituted.
Iraqi Christian demonstrators calling for the articles inclusion stated that the article’s removal was an indication that Christians are unwelcome in Iraq. Thair al-Sheekh, a priest at the Sacred Heart Church in Baghdad said, “I think this is the first time our government said that they don’t want the Christians to stay here. This is what we understand from this decision.” Likewise, Turkmen and Yazidi protesters submitted formal complaints to the Iraqi government calling exclusion of the article undemocratic.
An official amendment to the Provincial Elections Law allowing for the inclusion of Article 50 is not anticipated. However, pressure from Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, Kurdish representatives and the United Nations on Iraq’s Electoral Commission to ensure the representation of Iraq’s minorities, will likely result in the article’s implementation, regardless of its presence, in the January 2009 elections.
Increase in Shia Violence
The assassination of Saleh al-Auqaeili, a prominent member of the Sadr Movement, on October 9, 2008 foreshadows the days ahead. The Sadr Movement’s and Sunni’s boycott of the June 2005 provincial elections left the two parties poorly represented on Iraq’s provincial councils. In the January 2009 election, Sunni parties and the Sadr Movement hope to gain increased influence. For the Sunni parties, the change in representation will involve shifts in political alliances to include members of Iraq’s Awakening Councils. The transition is likely to be non-violent in nature.
Provincial elections in Iraq’s majority Shia provinces, however, will be more contentious. The Sadr Movement and SIIC are long time political and military rivals. The two parties have battled one another on numerous occasions since the fall of the Saddam regime and neither side is willing to acquiesce to its rival’s dominance. In the beginning, intra-Shia violence, however, is unlikely to take the form of a large-scale confrontation of party militias—the Badr Brigades and the Mahdi Army. Rather, the conflict between the parties is most likely to include targeted assassinations of leading party candidates. However, anger over assassinations is likely to result in the spread of the conflict to include confrontation between the rival militias.
Nonetheless, the SIIC will prove incapable of preventing significant gains by the Sadr Movement in the party’s strongholds.
