Highlights
– September 27, 2008 bombing in Damascus was likely a Sunni jihadist operation
– Syria is targeted as a result of its foreign policy and support of Hizballah and Alawites in northern Lebanon
– Syrian crackdown on Sunni extremists operating in Syria and Lebanon is anticipated
On September 27, 2008, Damascus was shook by an 8:45 am bombing near the Sayyida Zainab shrine and the Palestine office of the Syrian Intelligence Agency. The third targeted bombing in Syria in 2008, the blast was the deadliest bombing in Syria since the 1980s, killing 17 and wounding 14 civilians. In the immediate aftermath of the bombing, some in Syria pointed at Israel, but evidence has since indicated Sunni Islamic extremists as the likely culprits.
Given Syria’s delicate position in the Mideast region, Syrian national security is threatened by a number of factors including domestic and foreign grown Islamic extremism and targeting by regional government adversaries. However, given the recent upswing in Syrian Western cooperation and fighting between Sunni extremists and Alawites in northern Lebanon, Sunni jihadists are likely responsible and will be subject to Syrian military retaliation. In the interim, attacks against military and civilian targets in Syria will likely increase in the near to mid-term.
Influence of Sunni-Alawite Tension in Lebanon
A close neighbor and strong influence on Shia groups operating in Lebanon, Syrian intelligence officials are an obvious target for Sunni jihadists in Lebanon attempting to use Syria as a transit route to Iraq, as well as Lebanese al-Qaeda-linked groups who are seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate in northern Lebanon. For these groups, Syria is not only run by Alawite takfiris, a derogatory term used to describe blasphemous Muslims, but is also one of the region’s greatest political threats to the establishment of a Sunni Islamic caliphate.
Al-Qaeda-linked groups in Lebanon and Iraq are angered by Syria’s recent courtship of the West, including secret Syrian-Israeli track peace talks and enhanced Syrian diplomatic relations with France and Lebanon. The groups are also opposed to Syria’s sectarian government and its close ties with Iran, a Shia government, and Hizballah, who are the primary roadblock to Lebanese Sunni jihadist striking Israeli targets from Lebanon’s southern border.
A more tangible affront to Sunni power in northern Lebanon was Syria’s support of Lebanese Alawites against Sunni militias in Tripoli in October 2008. The sectarian-motivated fighting that left more than 20 dead and dozens wounded began when Sunni fighters attempted to takeover a small Alawite mosque in the city. Though the sects signed a truce agreement on September 8, 2008, intermittent fighting has continued and tensions remain high. The increased threat from Sunni extremists in northern Lebanon alarmed the Syrian government to the point that it dispatched nearly 10,000 soldiers to the Lebanese border on September 23, 2008, a move the Syrian military disguised as an effort to police smuggling.
Threat to Syrian National Security
The Syrian government undoubtedly recognizes the September 27, 2008 bombing, the assassinations of senior Syrian military officer Mohammad Suleiman and former Hizballah Security Chief Imad Mughnieh and sectarian fighting in northern Lebanon, are all serious threats to national security. The government, which has maintained relative stability in Syria as a result of its ability to suppress Islamist and political opposition, is unlikely to leave bombings against military and civilian targets on its territory unpunished.
The first order of action will likely be conducting a large-scale policing campaign of Sunni extremist groups operating in Syria. Targeted groups will be primarily Salafi jihadists potentially linked to al-Qaeda, but the government will probably also take advantage of the opportunity to oppress members of the outlawed Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The second order of business will be to increase counterinsurgency efforts against jihadists operating in northern Lebanon. Normally, Syria’s capacity for retaliation against a target operating outside of Syrian territory would be significantly weakened, but in this case, jihadists’ targeting of Lebanese military officials and soldiers could provide Syrian military and intelligence officials more leeway to respond.
Such cooperation will only occur if March 14-linked militias are not targeted and the Lebanese military is informed of and leads all operations on Lebanese soil. The extent and limitations of Syrian and Lebanese military cooperation will be subject to extensive diplomatic negotiation. Should the two parties succeed in forming a joint offensive against Sunni jihadists operating in their territories, the groups’ presence and operational capabilities will be significantly lessened. However, in the interim, an increase in attacks against military and civilian targets in both Lebanon and Syria is anticipated.
