Highlights
– Hizballah and 15 Salafist groups sign a memorandum of understanding
– Radical Salafist groups in Lebanon remain opposed to the memorandum
– Sunni-Alawite violence in northern Lebanon is unlikely to cease as a result of the agreement
Hizballah and 15 Lebanese Salafist groups signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on August 19, 2008, signifying an attempt by the two groups to negotiate an end to sectarian violence. According to the MoU, the two groups agreed to:
• Condemning any Islamic group that assaults another
• Abandoning incitement, which creates trouble and will allow the enemies to take advantage of the situation
• Confronting the American agenda, which creates division
• Firmly supporting Hezbollah and the Salafist movement if any internal or external parties act unfairly
• Forming a religious committee to discuss any disagreements between the Shia and the Sunnis
• Respecting each others’ opinions
Though the agreement is a sign of cooperation between Hizballah and some of Lebanon’s Salafist leaders, the groups represented did not represent the most radical of Lebanon’s Salafist groups, and therefore does not signify an immediate end to sectarian fighting.
Hizballah Motivations
Since its May 7, 2008 seizure of 60 percent of West Beirut, Hizballah has struggled to reassert itself as a nationalist movement (Previous Report). Despite its recent political gains—including winning veto power on the Lebanese cabinet and the implied recognition of its right to arms through Parliament’s August 12, 2008 approval of the Cabinet’s policy statement, which acknowledged “the right of Lebanon’s people, the army and the resistance to liberate all its territories,” – Hizballah’s aggressive political maneuvering is a source of anger and resentment among Lebanese Sunnis.
Salafist groups, particularly in northern Lebanon, decided to fight back against perceived Hizballah military domination, striking Alawite targets in and around Tripoli. Though political tensions between Hizballah and Lebanese Salafist groups have simmered since the end of the Lebanese Civil War, the Tripoli attacks were the first organized Salafist offensive against a Lebanese Shia minority group since the 1990s. Undoubtedly, Hizballah views Sunni-Shia strife in northern Lebanon as an unwanted distraction. Therefore, following a broad political victory in the Lebanese parliament and cabinet, Hizballah’s decision to sign an MoU with the Salafist groups was undoubtedly intended to fortify its legitimacy as a nationalist political and military power.
Implications of MoU
The Hizballah-Salafist MoU was signed by 15 of Lebanon’s Salafist groups, including some that are engaging Lebanese Alawites in Tripoli. However, Lebanon’s most radical Salafist groups were not party to the MoU, including the group led by the founder of the Salafist movement in Lebanon, Sheikh Dai al-Islam al-Chahhal.
Sheikh al-Chahhal was the first Salafi leader to publicly object to the MoU, saying, “Those who accepted the memorandum do not represent the Salafist movement, and they have no influence…This memorandum is pro-Hezbollah, pro-Shia propaganda, and is against the interest of the Sunnis.” He is undoubtedly joined by Lebanon’s more radical Salafist groups, like Fatah al-Islam who in the past threatened to assassinate 15 Hizballah leaders because of Hizballah’s refusal to allow Salafist groups to launch strikes against Israeli targets from Lebanon’s southern border (Previous Report).
The point was further expounded upon by another radical Salafist leader, Sheikh Bilal Dokmak, who said the Salafist have always objected to Hizballah’s right to arms because Hizballah is only fighting to liberate Lebanese lands. “We believe that one should fight Israel in the name of Allah (God), and never stop [even] if all the land is liberated,” he explained.
Looking Forward
Though Hizballah reached an agreement with some Salafist groups, fighting between Sunnis and Alawites in northern Lebanon is unlikely to cease in the near-term. Among the radical players on both sides there remains a vast separation between their political and military goals. Also, Hizballah’s position in the south complicates the matter.
Hizballah is cognizant that any strike from Lebanon’s border will be accredited to its militia, making it unlikely to permit radical Salafist groups to launch strikes against Israeli targets from Hizballah-controlled regions of Lebanon. Therefore, though future talks between Hizballah and radical Salafist groups may take place, it is unlikely these talks will prove fruitful.
