Highlights
– Peru’s communist guerilla group, Sendero Luminoso (SL), begins to recruit members and execute attacks on police forces
– Security personnel fear new resurgence of SL activities, citing similar trends
– Despite new cash sources and rising recruitment, SL lacks operational capacity to pose a threat to the government in the near to mid-term.
Largely dormant since the arrest of its leaders in the mid-1990s, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL), one of Peru’s fiercest guerrilla groups, has been making new headlines in recent months. Backed with growing funds from their new involvement in Peru’s lucrative drug trafficking market, SL members are seeking to attract new members with the promise of protection and high salaries. Attacks in recent months have increased, primarily targeting security forces and police. While active fighters’ numbers have steadily climbed since 2000, SL does not have the membership to pose a high threat to the government in the near to mid-term. However, involvement in the drug trade and the growing involvement of past members may lead the group to garner a stronger position to re-group in Peru’s rural regions, allowing the development of tactics for targeting the government in the long-term.
Historical Overview
Nearly 70,000 people were killed during the height of the SL’s activities from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, a majority of whom were peasants caught in the crossfire between the guerillas and soldiers. A Maoist movement who intended to impose a communist regime within Peru, the SL was founded by ideologue Abimael Guzman. SL was comprised of 10,000 fighters, with hundreds more supporters across the countryside, responsible for bombing electrical towers, bridges, factories, as well as assassinating public figures and peasants alike.
Due largely to the “iron-fist” law and order policies of former President Alberto Fujimori, the SL slowly disintegrated after the capture of its leader, Guzman, in 1992. By 1999, fewer than 200 fighters were believed to be active, contained largely to the Apurimac and Huallaga valleys.
Recent Resurgence
In 1999, a top lieutenant of Guzman’s, who had been opposed to the groups’ involvement in Peru’s rampant cocaine trade, was captured. Since his detainment, remaining SL members have become increasingly involved in the drug market, earning cash by both protecting crops of coca, the base ingredient for cocaine, as well as providing armed escorts to smugglers transporting drugs through the mountains. This transition is similar to that of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), who have shifted from larger ideological goals to a greater focus on narco-terrorism. However, the SL does number close to that of the FARC, and their ability to terrorize will remain much lower than that of the FARC in the near-term.
This cash has translated into purchases of assault rifles, and for paying salaries to members, at a lucrative offer of US$20 a day to rural farmers’ children. Local populations are worried that the younger generation who does not remember the SL’s past campaigns of violence will be tempted into membership. In addition to being used to recruit new members, SL members have employed new funds to purchase supplies in stores, a divergent tactic from their past tactics of raiding rural settlements for food and medical supplies. Their new “peaceful” activities have likely helped to earn some greater legitimacy among a cautious population.
The manner in which SL’s message is being portrayed has also changed drastically since their former period. Rural villagers have reported being approached by SL members, who have promised that if the farmers begin to or continue to plant coca crops, the SL will protect them and their crops. Rather than targeting civilians who they believed may have been informants or government supporters like in the past, the SL’s recent attacks have largely focused on security personnel. Since the decision to make wide-sweeping operational changes, 40 police officers have been killed in ambushes in an around the Apurimac valley since 2005. The worst incident occurred in November 2007, when a group of over 60 guerillas attacked a police station in the mountain town of Ocobamba, destroying the building and killing its commander. While the army has pledged to increase cooperation with police, especially in rural areas, Peru continues to face defense budgeting issues, likely limiting its ability to aid local forces in the near to mid-term.
Reminiscent of the Past
A few trends in recent SL activities have begun to worry government officials who remember its past activities all too well. Many rebels who are being released from prison after serving their sentences originally issued during the 1980s and 1990s are returning to clandestine political organizing tactics. As seen during the group’s beginnings in the 1980s, pro-SL rhetoric in labor unions and universities has been reported, protected under free speech laws. Peruvian government officials do not keep tabs on released SL members, and security officials feel the government does not understand the potential danger of permitting remnants of the SL remain active. According to former SL commanders now working with security forces, Guzman retains a long-term strategy for the group, and is working through outside contacts to bring latent groups back under his control.
Future Outlook
Backed by drug money, the SL has begun to develop greater organizational, recruitment and logistical capabilities. While the total estimated membership is far below peak numbers, SL’s membership has quadrupled to 800 since 2000, indicating a period of growth not seen in many years.
Additionally, since the SL is primarily attracting younger individuals the group’s focus on its larger ideological mission is likely to change. While older members may attempt to hold onto the communist goal, new members will likely focus on profit-making opportunities in the drug trade.
While the SL does not have the membership numbers to pose a large threat to the government in the near to mid-term, the government’s lack of action against remaining active members, and those recently released from prison, may result in a stronger SL in the long-term.
