Highlights
– Sadr Movement ceasefire takes effect
– Al-Maliki government falls short of disarming militia members
– Al-Sadr’s position within his movement and in the Iraqi political arena is bolstered
– Dialogue between the al-Maliki government and the Sadr Movement likely
Despite Iraqi government threats to forcefully disarm the south’s “outlaws and criminals,” it was a statement from Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr that ended six days of fighting between US and Iraqi forces and Mahdi Army fighters. In his statement, al-Sadr called on fighters “to end all military actions in Basra and in all the provinces” and “to cooperate with the government to achieve security.” Al-Sadr’s call for a ceasefire, however, was balanced by demands for the release of all members of the Mahdi Army in Iraqi prisons, general amnesty for his followers, and the return of persons displaced by military operations.
In order for the Iraqi government to move forward, it will have to limit its operations to those that solely target “rogue elements” of the Mahdi Army and re-engage al-Sadr in Iraqi politics.
Sadr’s Consolidated Position
Brokered by Ali Adeeb (Dawa Party) and Hadi al-Amiri (the Badr Organization) with al-Sadr in Iran, the ceasefire agreement displays the newly consolidated strength of the Sadr Movement. The sheikh’s ability to hold off an US/Iraqi military onslaught, and then implement a ceasefire in the midst of heavy and sustained fighting demonstrates the authority with which he continues to command his followers. Though previously al-Sadr spoke of “rogue elements” within his organization orchestrating attacks of their own design, the Shia leader now asserts that he and Qais al-Khazali, leader of the Special Groups (“rogue elements”) who is now in US custody, have reconciled. As a result, al-Sadr is now considered to be in control of the vast majority of the Mahdi Army fighters.
By engaging the Iraqi forces, the Sadr Movement achieved two primary aims. It gained political clout by demonstrating its military strength, while displaying the weaknesses of the al-Maliki government. At the same time, al-Sadr reinforced his position within the movement by appeasing retaliation calls from his followers. Having achieved these objectives, the Sadr Movement exhibited to both the al-Maliki government and its own followers that it continues to be a skilled and capable opponent and will not relinquish its claim to power in Basra without a fight.
Prime Minister al-Maliki’s Weakened Position
To the degree that al-Sadr demonstrated his political prowess; Iraqi Prime Minister (PM) al-Maliki revealed his weakness as a political leader. In order to avoid further displays of weakness, the government will not acquiesce to al-Sadr’s demands. However, the point will have already been made. Over the past week, al-Sadr exhibited the vast amount of support and authority he continues to command in Basra, Nasariyyia, Sadr City, Kut, and Samawa. The Sadr Movement believes the raid against its followers in Basra and subsequent cities was an attempt to limit the movement’s authority in the south prior to the October provincial elections. Subsequently, the Sadr Movement is sponsoring calls for PM al-Maliki’s resignation. For its part, the al-Maliki government persists in its assertions that the offensive targeted criminal gangs, not the Mahdi Army. Nonetheless, PM al-Maliki’s decision to launch the Basra raid that would claim the lives of 461 Iraqis was taken without prior consultation with Parliament, a move that has angered many Parliamentarians.
A Look Forward
Increased factional violence in southern Iraq is anticipated as the political and militia leaders fight for enhanced influence in the lead up to a decreased US military role (Previous Report). By standing up to US and Iraqi raids, the Sadr Movement is seeking to reinforce its position in the south, while staving off efforts by the al-Maliki government to diminish the movement’s support in the lead up to the October 2008 provincial elections.
In the end, the two Shia parties will be forced to compromise their rigid positions. Al-Sadr remains firmly opposed to federation in Iraq, a plan supported by the Dawa Party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), compromise between the blocs will not be easily reached. However, last week’s violence proved that military force was not the answer to the al-Maliki government’s woes. Therefore, open dialogue between the al-Maliki government and the Sadr Movement are necessary and will likely be opened in the near to mid-term.
