Highlights
– Chad rebels threaten oil field attacks
– European Union Force Chad/CAR (EUFOR) unable to prevent attacks
– Situation in Chad, Sudan, and CAR will continue to deteriorate
Demonstrating discontent over a lack of political dialogue following their failed coup attempt in early February 2008 (Previous Report), Timane Erdimi, leader of the Chadian rebel group Rally of Forces for Change (RFC), has threatened to attack Chad’s oil fields if the United States and France do not increase pressure on Chadian President Idriss Deby to hold talks with the rebel groups. While the myriad of rebel groups remain politically divided, they continue to coordinate military attacks, such as the surprise strike on N’Djamena on February 2, 2008.
Operational Capabilities
In recent months, continued military coordination among the rebel groups, combined with the support of Khartoum, has increased their operational capabilities. Further, the February 2, 2008 assault on N’Djamena, which nearly toppled Deby’s 18-year regime, was almost successful due to the speed with which they advanced from the Sudan-Chad border to the capital, an operation largely characterized by combined military commands and improved weapons from Khartoum.
While attacks have thus far been limited primarily to the eastern part of the country along the border with the Darfur region of Sudan and several attempted sieges of N’Djamena, the rebels possess the ability to launch attacks on the oil fields located in the southern part of Chad known as Doba. With the porous Darfur and Central African Republic (CAR) borders due to the ongoing hostilities in Darfur, rebels have successfully launched attacks on N’Djamena originating in CAR. The previous attacks indicate future strikes against the oil fields are likely to originate from northwestern CAR.
Oil Field Attacks Likely
Mirroring attacks by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Sudan, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in Nigeria, and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia, the RFC and its affiliated rebel groups are likely to attack the oil fields in Doba. With oil revenues comprising a large portion of Chad’s economy, disrupting the estimated 140,00 to 160,000 barrels per day (bpd) would further weaken Deby’s regime.
China and Sudan remain opposed to Deby’s support of JEM due to previous attacks against Chinese oil fields in the Kordofan region of Sudan (Previous Report). Therefore, it is likely Khartoum and Beijing actively support and may encourage Chadian rebel attacks on the oil fields. Furthermore, overthrowing Deby and replacing him with a pro-China regime would allow China to increase its controlling interests on central African oil.
EUFOR: Too Few Troops, Too Limited Mandate, Too Little Impact
While the deployment of the European Union Force Chad/CAR (EUFOR) is a positive development for the refugee camps in Chad and the CAR, the nascent force maintains a mere three stations. EUFOR is currently stationed in N’Djamena, in the eastern Chadian city of Abeche along the Darfur border, and in the northeastern CAR town of Birao near the Sudanese and Chadian borders. The limited deployment of the 3,700 troops and 10 attack helicopters requires EUFOR to focus on its primary mission of protecting the refugee camps. Therefore, a rebel attack from the western part of CAR would be highly unlikely to be impeded by EUFOR troops.
Outlook
The recent peace agreement signed on March 13, 2008, the fifth such document in six years, between Chad and Sudan to end hostilities will have little, if any, tangible results as rebel groups backed by both sides have stated the agreement does not apply to them.
The continued marginalization of the rebel groups and their political desires, coupled with the international community’s continued support of Deby, will serve to perpetuate the tense situation. Further, due to Deby’s refusal to negotiate with rebels, coupled with the continual support of France and the United States, it is unlikely progress to forge a peace agreement will be made in the near to mid-term.
Rebel groups are growing increasingly discontented with Deby’s rule, as well as their ability to nearly overthrow his regime in early February. Therefore, further attacks are likely to occur. The lack of dialogue appears unlikely to change, as the international community remains focused on the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Ongoing attacks, especially those targeting oil fields, will further deteriorate the situation in Chad, CAR, and Sudan.
