Highlights
– Turkish government is investing in long-term strategies to defeat the PKK
– Development in Kurdish regions is designed to ameliorate Kurdish discontent
– The PKK is searching for relevancy, has yet to be defeated
The Turkish government appears resolute on combating the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) through military and police actions. Turkey’s cross-border operations into Northern Iraq over the past several months have culminated in a brief ground incursion into Northern Iraq and underscores the Turkish government’s view of the PKK as a serious threat.
Further, the Turkish government has made it clear they are disinterested in dialoguing with the PKK. However, now it appears the country is interested in pursuing alternative, but not exclusive, approaches to defeating the PKK. Along with military means, Prime Minister Erdogan has noted that the fight against the PKK must include socio-economic, psychological, and cultural means as well. As part of this approach, he announced a US$12 billion investment infusion for southeastern Turkey, a heavily Kurdish populated region of the country. The plan underscores hope that a revitalized region will help create jobs and more economic prosperity.
Incentives for the Kurdish Region
The finance package also includes funding for two major dams, a system of canals, paved roads, and removal of landmines along the Syrian border. The reasoning for this investment is a simple one—to make life more palatable for Kurds living in this region, to give them hope for the future, and most importantly to draw them away from militancy and groups like the PKK. With this preemptive strategy, Turkish authorities aspire to draw individuals away from the ranks of the PKK, thereby weakening the organization. In addition, the Turkish government will now dedicate a state television station to Kurdish language programming with Arabic and Persian language programming as well. Previously, the Turkish government was vehemently opposed to the Kurdish language in the public domain, as they believed that this would encourage the formation of a Kurdish state.
The Ebb and Flow of the PKK
In 2004 the PKK broke their cease-fire, ending a period of dormancy amid claims they were under continued attack at the behest of the Turkish government. The cease-fire came about after almost two decades of conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government. Civilians, especially Kurdish, frequently were victimized by the violence, and as a result the PKK began to lose support of the local Kurdish population grown weary of the violence.
Coinciding with the decline of public support for the PKK, the Turkish government began to improve some Kurdish minority democratic and political rights in the last decade as part of an overall improvement in Turkey’s human rights record, in hope of one day becoming an official member of the European Union (EU). This gave some hope to the Kurdish population that their economic and cultural disparity could be aided without the use of violence. At the time, PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan was imprisoned, and many PKK members fled across the border to Northern Iraq. Thus it seemed the PKK was in search of its own relevancy during its dormant period. However, the organization may have been weakened, but it was far from impotent as it established safe havens across the border from which to re-launch its terror campaign in Turkey.
Outlook
The Turkish government is obviously trying to win the hearts and minds of the Kurdish people and this may prove to be a positive strategy. This does not necessarily mean that their military strategy is failing or discontinued, but shows an understanding that military force alone will not solve the issue of the PKK. The Turkish government has also stated that Turkey is the open door from Northern Iraq to the world. People may have relatives on both sides of the border as well as cultural and economic ties. Therefore, the Turkish government views an economically developed area as more stable and therefore, more lucrative region. If the local Kurdish population is engaged and integrated with a positive economic outlook, they may turn away from groups like the PKK. However, the Turkish government must maintain a consistent approach to its Kurdish minority or else risk giving the PKK increased political ammunition. This is a long-term approach and it may be several years or even a decade before we will see any concrete results of this strategy.
