Highlights
– Hamas transformed from a charitable organization into one of Palestine’s strongest militias
– PLO participation in the Oslo Accords led to a radicalization of tactics
– Will not yield to Israeli demands no matter how high the cost
– Will likely regain its seats in Parliament in the long-term
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin founded Hamas in the midst of the first Intifada in Gaza in December 1987. Sheikh Yassin preached and did charitable work in coordination with the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). He created the al-Mujamma’ al-Islami (the Islamic Center) to coordinate with the MB’s political agenda in Gaza and, later, Hamas to operate as the MB’s political arm in Gaza.
Hamas published its charter in 1988. Enshrined in its charter, Hamas’ mission is to bring about the destruction of Israel, to overthrow the Palestinian Authority (PA) and replace it with an Islamic state, and to raise “the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine.” Nonetheless, viewing the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the principal threat, Israel funded Hamas in its infancy to counter the PLO’s authority in the Palestinian Territories. Today, however, the tables have turned and Hamas is considered “Enemy Number One” having grown to be more radical and of equal power to its Palestinian counterpart, Fatah.
Keeping the Struggle Alive
Though Hamas was originally established to assist in the distribution of international humanitarian aid, it soon morphed into one of the Palestinian territories most fervent militias. Initially, Hamas targeted Palestinian moderates, Hamas dissidents, and rival PLO members. However, in 1989 Hamas began targeting the Israeli military via kidnappings and stabbings. By 1993, in a strong reaction to the PLO’s participation in the Oslo Accords, Hamas expanded its range of targets to include targeting Israeli civilians. Subsequent strikes included the bombing of cafes, nightclubs, shopping malls, buses, and busy traffic intersections.
Though Hamas has employed a wide variety of tactics over the years, it gained notoriety for its use of suicide bombers. In one quote, its leaders referred to suicide missions as the “F16” of the Palestinian people. Hamas’ most recent suicide attack was on February 4, 2008 in the Israeli border town Dimona (Terrorist Attack, Previous Report). Though the attack claimed only one casualty, the attack broke the year of silence since the last suicide attack occurred in Israel on January 29, 2007.
Gaza Victory
After declaring a short-lived ceasefire with Israel in 2005, Hamas redirected its political campaign. As a result, when free and fair elections were finally held in the Palestinian Territories in February 2006, Hamas won 44 percent of the popular vote, giving it the majority in the PA Parliament. The election results were undesirable for the former ruling party, Fatah, and the International Community. Consequently, skirmishes broke out between Fatah and Hamas supporters, and later escalated into factional conflict. For its part, the International Community rejected Hamas’ victory and withdrew its humanitarian funding, calling on Hamas to recognize Israel and retract sections of its charter that call for Israel’s destruction.
The European Union later reinstated a large portion of its humanitarian aid, but the power struggle between Fatah and Hamas waged on, taking its toll on the territories.
In June 2007, the conflict culminated in full-scale battle for Gaza. Fatah was defeated and Hamas gained administrative control of the territory. An unacceptable outcome for Israel and the US, Hamas’ victory in Gaza led to a violent conflict between Hamas and Israeli security forces and a debilitating blockade of the Gaza territory.
Future Outlook
There is no end in sight to the Gaza conflict. Though rocket fire into Israel has slowed in recent weeks, Hamas is giving no indication it intends to yield to Israeli demands. Instead, the group has held large-scale demonstrations against Israel and expanded its range of targets.
The March 6, 2008 shooting at Mercaz Harav seminary, which was later claimed by both Hamas and the Martyrs of Imad Mughnieh will inevitably lead to a conflict between Hamas and Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox community. If Hamas and the Yeshiva community engage in a tit-for-tat retribution campaign, Jerusalem will be drawn into the Gaza conflict, a scenario that will silence the peace talks and possibly ignite a third Intifada.
Due to Israel’s unpopular military campaign in Gaza, Hamas is gaining increased popular support in Gaza, the West Bank, and neighboring countries. Therefore, Hamas will maintain a high level of influence in the Palestinian Territories, and inevitably on the peace process, for the near- to mid-term. If the conflict continues unabated, growing popular support for Hamas will eventually force Fatah to enter into negotiations with Hamas leadership. Further, a compromised position between the two parties will include the return of Hamas representatives to their seats in the PA Parliament (Previous Report).