Highlights
– Ongoing peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA have reached crucial phase
– Internal turmoil in the LRA has further complicated the negotiations
– Recent breakthrough in talks is best chance yet for two sides to reach an agreement on a final peace deal
Peace talks between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have reached a crucial point. After beginning in July 2006 with a cease-fire agreement, the talks have continually been delayed, mostly due to unreasonable demands by LRA leader Joseph Kony. While the cease-fire has repeatedly been renewed by both sides since 2006, with the latest being a one month renewal in January 2008, the Ugandan government appears to be seriously considering an end to the cease-fire by the conclusion of February 2008.
While Uganda is participating in the latest round of talks, which began on February 18, 2008, it has accused the LRA of violating the cease-fire by launching attacks in southern Sudan and leaving camps they are required to stay in, located between south Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), to head towards the Central African Republic (CAR).
The LRA’s Internal Turmoil
The talks have been complicated by other recent developments as well. Internally, the LRA continues to experience disorder. Of note, Vincent Otti, the LRA’s deputy commander and the strongest proponent of the peace talks, was reported dead. The circumstances of his death remain unclear, but it is believed he was ordered killed by Kony, either due to fears Otti was planning to assassinate Kony or due to Kony’s belief that Otti was profiting from the peace talks. Additionally, it is believed that Okot Odhiambo replaced Otti as the second in command. Odhiambo and Kony are among the five top LRA members wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for committing war crimes. The death of Otti will likely have a significant impact on the peace talks, as he was one of the few LRA members fluent in English.
Further complicating the situation, on October 2, 2007, Patrick Opio Makasi, the LRA’s operational director, surrendered to the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The defection of Opio and the death of Otti have decreased the LRA’s operational capabilities, at least in the short term. Fears abound that the Ugandan government’s frustration with lack of progress being made in the peace talks combined with the perception that the LRA is vulnerable could lead to an attempt by the Ugandan government to defeat the LRA.
Sudanese Involvement
The LRA conflict in northern Uganda has involved Sudan since at least 1994. During the final decade of the civil war between north and south Sudan, the Sudanese government in Khartoum provided the LRA with support, including weapons, money, food, and shelter. In return, the LRA would launch attacks on the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), the southern Sudanese rebels. The 2006 peace talks, signed in Juba, southern Sudan, are largely due to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the 21-year civil war between Khartoum and the SPLA/M. Without Khartoum backing the LRA and stability in southern Sudan, the LRA was forced to move to the Garamba National Park, in the DR Congo. The weaker LRA, coupled with the Government of Southern Sudan’s (GoSS) ability to focus on the LRA now that the war with the north was over, led to the 2006 Juba cease-fire.
The same circumstances that allowed the cease-fire to be signed may now lead to its violation. Tensions between the GoSS and Khartoum have increased significantly in the past few months, culminating in the October 12, 2007 withdrawal of GoSS members of the government of national unity. While the GoSS rejoined the government on December 12, 2007, tensions between Khartoum and the GoSS remain elevated. The recent series of LRA attacks in southern Sudan are likely to have been authorized by Khartoum. We believe with elections in southern Sudan scheduled for 2009 and a referendum on secession scheduled for 2011, Khartoum will continue to use the LRA as its proxy in southern Sudan.
Additionally, the most pressing issue between Khartoum and the GoSS is the oil-rich region of Abyei. With the 2011 referendum lexpected to approve secession, Khartoum will use all means at its disposal, including the LRA, to prevent the loss of Abyei. Additionally, as the GoSS focuses on the implementation of the CPA and Khartoum’s ongoing efforts to avoid full implementation, its focus will shift from the peace talks in Juba to the CPA.
Regional Impact
While the peace talks have lasted over 18 months falling short of achieving a long-term peace deal, the stability and lack of violence in northern Uganda over that time is unprecedented since the LRA began its uprising in 1987. The stability in Uganda has come when the surrounding region has experienced significant instability. The ongoing crises in Kenya, resulting in thousands of refugees currently residing in Uganda, and the North Kivu area of eastern DR Congo, requiring the MONUC forces to focus their attention on General Laurent Nkuda’s forces rather than the LRA, would be further exacerbated if hostilities were to renew between the LRA and the Ugandan government.
Should the Ugandan government decide to attack the LRA, it would have to be sure it could defeat the LRA completely. Otherwise, the situation will return to the level of violence seen from 1987-2006. Khartoum, hoping to continue using the LRA as its proxy when necessary, would provide the LRA with support. For this to occur, the government in the DR Congo and MONUC would have to devote troops currently in North Kivu to the Garamba National Park area, likely causing chaos in both regions of the DR Congo. The GoSS would then be forced to focus its military forces on protecting its people in the southern region of the country, away from Abyei and Khartoum’s troops.
A Way Forward
The peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government are crucial to regional stability. With an estimated 20,000 killed and 2 million displaced by the 21-year conflict, a permanent cease-fire would end one of Africa’s longest running and most brutal wars. To ensure the talks result in a permanent peace agreement, the international community must increase its support of the Juba peace talks. The recent appointment of Timothy Shortley by the US Department of State to represent the US at the peace talks is a positive sign. Additionally, the United Nations must ensure its Special Envoy, former Mozambique president Joachim Chissano, participates in the latest round of talks.
The final peace accord must be acceptable to Kony. Such an accord will have to ensure he is not sent to the International Criminal Court (ICC) but it must include some judicial process to ensure he is held accountable for his actions. However, in order to ensure peace in northern Uganda it may be necessary for the final peace deal to include asylum in another country for Kony. Second in importance only to the status of Kony will be the demobilization of LRA rebels. Ensuring rebels are reintegrated into society will be an important step towards ensuring the end of violence in northern Uganda.
Landmark Agreement Reached
On February 18, 2008, the LRA and the Ugandan government reached a landmark agreement on how to handle war crimes committed over the past 21 years. The most severe crimes will be dealt with under a special division of the High Court in Uganda. Lesser crimes will be dealt by employing “Mato Oput”, a traditional reconciliation process used by the Acholi people of northern Ugandan. The deal is a significant breakthrough for the peace talks and suggests a long-term peace agreement is likely to be reached by the end of February. However, it remains unclear how the LRA members wanted by the ICC would be handled. Kony has repeatedly stated he will not approve any final peace deal that would require him to be tried in The Hague. Therefore, it is crucial for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to use its power to defer ICC investigations for renewable, one-year increments.
Outlook
Uganda’s recent warning that it is considering a military offensive against the LRA has likely created a greater leverage for the peace talks. However, the intermiable pace of the talks has increasingly frustrated Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. Having hoped to have a deal in place before the end of 2007, the extension of the cease-fire has further added to his urgency in securing a deal. With regional security issues currently straining the international community’s relief efforts, it is likely Museveni will not end the cease-fire. However, ongoing LRA attacks in southern Sudan could ultimately lead to a military offensive. If a final agreement is not reached during this week’s round of talks, Museveni will likely renew the cease-fire for another month.
The breakthrough on how to try war crimes is a significant step forward that bodes well for the peace talks. If the negotiations can devise a way to avoid sending Kony to the ICC, a long-term peace may be possible.
