Highlights
-Despite increased government crackdown, MNJ remains serious threat
-In addition to attacks on Nigerien troops, MNJ will increasingly focus on foreign companies operating in Niger
-Kidnapping of town prefect in January 2008 signals focus on government officials
Since launching a rebellion on February 8, 2007 in an attack against Nigerien soldiers , the Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) has continued to increase its ability to launch attacks throughout a large part of Niger while simultaneously diversifying its targets for attacks. The MNJ is seeking the full implementation of the 1995 peace accord that ended the first Tuareg uprising. The peace accord was supposed to result in an increase in development projects in the northern part of the country, which is primarily composed of ethnic Tuaregs, as well as a greater sharing of profits from the uranium industry. However, the MNJ contends that the government has failed to implement either part of the peace accord. Since its inception, the Nigerien government in Niamey has repeatedly refused to negotiate with the MNJ and refers to it as “bandits.”
While the first attacks perpetrated by the MNJ targeted Nigerien soldiers, within months the MNJ had begun to target foreign companies operating in Niger. On April 20, 2007, MNJ rebels attacked a uranium exploration camp operated by the French uranium company Areva . Following the Areva attack and an attack on the airport in Agadez , the second most important airport in Niger, especially for the tourism industry, the Nigerien armed forces (Forces Nationales D’Intervention et de Securite (FNIS)) launched an intense crackdown on the MNJ. As part of the crackdown, a three-month state of emergency was declared in northern Niger in August 2007, which was renewed for another three months this past November.
Tuareg Rebellion Spreads
In late Summer 2007, the MNJ formed an alliance with Tuaregs based in Mali. After several weeks of attacks by MNJ-affiliated Malian Tuareg rebels, the Malian government began negotiations with the Malian rebels and reached a tentative agreement for a cease-fire.
The MNJ is estimated to have around 2,000 militants fighting for its cause. There are unconfirmed reports that members of the Niger Rapid Intervention Company, a 130-member special force division of the FNIS that received training from the United States under the Pan-Sahel Initiative and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative, have joined the MNJ, creating a division of the MNJ known as the Rapid Intervention Troops (TIR). In January 2008, the MNJ also formed an alliance with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara (FARS) (Previous Report). While FARS is a smaller rebel group, the alliance highlights the continued growth of the MNJ movement despite the government crackdown. Additionally, the alliance between FARS, which is predominately comprised of members of the Tubu tribe, with the Tuareg MNJ illustrates the MNJ’s collaboration with other ethnic tribes who have similar grievances against the Niger government.
Tactics
The MNJ employs myriad tactics typical of rebel groups operating in Africa. In addition to direct confrontation with FNIS soldiers, the MNJ has employed a variety of tactics typical of guerrilla warfare. The MNJ has planted landmines in areas frequented by FNIS vehicles, as well as vehicles used by foreign uranium companies. In addition to laying landmines themselves, there are reports the MNJ has been paying locals to plant landmines when FNIS vehicles are in the area. The MNJ has also employed kidnapping FNIS soldiers. The attacks on foreign companies mirrors attacks against oil companies by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in Nigeria, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Sudan, and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia.
The MNJ’s use of the Internet to disseminate propaganda mirrors the growing use of the Internet by other rebel groups in spreading their message. The attack on the Agadez airport highlights the MNJ’s willingness to engage with FNIS soldiers directly. There are unconfirmed reports that Libya and Sudan have provided the group with funds, though the MNJ denies foreign involvement in its rebel movement.
In an example of system disruption, the MNJ attacked a power station on August 10, 2007 to disrupt the ability of uranium mines in the area to operate. In September 2007, MNJ militants used heavy guns to attack an American military plane in Mali. While the plane suffered damage, it was able to land without incident.
Threats to Foreign Companies
The MNJ has previously attacked uranium mines operated by both Sino-U, a Chinese owned uranium company, and Areva. As part of its demands, the MNJ is seeking a greater distribution of wealth from uranium sales, the one natural resource Niger has and which is predominately located within the central and northern parts of Niger, which is dominated by Tuaregs. Since October 2007, the MNJ has increasingly threatened to attack foreign companies operating in Niger. In an October 28, 2007 communiqué on its website (Previous Report), the MNJ warned Areva to leave northern Niger or face “serious consequences.”
Another MNJ communiqué stated it will “not accept any interference in a domestic dispute.” The MNJ specifically mentions France, China, and Russia as providing military aid to the Nigerien government (Previous Report). The MNJ have also repeatedly threatened Alain Nero, the head of Areva, and Ibrahim Souley, the chief of staff of Areva. In an interview with the French newspaper Le Nouvel, MNJ leader Rhissa Ag Boula warned, “We are going to attack the uranium mines, including those belonging to Areva, halt the operations of the plants or opening up of new sites, and target the road shipments to the sea.”
Increased Tempo of Attacks in 2008
The last weeks of 2007 and the first of 2008 have seen an increase in attacks by MNJ militants. Most significant is the January 21, 2008 attack in the town of Tanhout. In addition to being the farthest south the MNJ has perpetrated an attack, the kidnapping of the town prefect is the first time the MNJ has kidnapped a government official. Previous kidnappings involved FNIS soldiers and one Sino-U executive. Currently, the MNJ is still holding approximately 30 FNIS soldiers hostage. An attack five days later on January 26th appears to have been an attempt to kidnap the deputy chairman of Niger’s National Commission for Human Rights, who failed to show up at a scheduled event.
Outlook
The increase in attacks in the first weeks of 2008 indicates the MNJ will intensify its campaign in the coming months. Based on past successful attacks against uranium companies and the recent increase in threats, MNJ rebels are likely to increase attacks against uranium mines, with a focus on those owned and operate by Areva. Attacks against FNIS soldiers will also continue to increase. The kidnapping of the prefect of Tanhout suggests the MNJ will also view kidnapping government officials as a legitimate tactic.
Despite one year having passed since the MNJ began its campaign with the clearly stated goal of negotiating with the Nigerien government to discuss full implementation of the 1995 peace accords, the government in Niamey continues to dismiss the group as “bandits.” As such, negotiations between the government and the rebels are unlikely to occur in the near-term.
Therefore, the MNJ will continue its armed rebellion until its demands are met. The FNIS has repeatedly proved it is unable to deter MNJ attacks and it is unlikely the FNIS will significantly improve its ability to disrupt future MNJ operations.
