Highlights
− The February 4, 2008 Dimona suicide bomb attack triggers renewed Israeli interest in enhancing security along its border with Egypt
− The orchestration of the attack by the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade in Gaza puts increased pressure on President Abbas to exert authority over rogue insurgencies in the Palestinian Territories
− Israel will likely increase military operations in Gaza, possibly leading to a limited reoccupation of Gaza along the Rafah border crossing
The February 4, 2008 Dimona suicide bomb attack was the first terrorist attack against the small southern Israeli city and the first suicide attack in Israel since January 29, 2007. One Israeli woman was killed and 14 others were injured in the explosion. In a press conference, the Fatah-affiliated Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the United Resistance Committees claimed joint responsibility for the attack.
In his statement, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade spokesman Abu Fouad said the previously planned operation was made possible after militants breached Gaza’s border with Egypt on January 23, 2008. Abu Fouad indicated that the attackers crossed into Egypt following the border breach, then infiltrated into Israel with the assistance of “private contacts.”
Discrepancies arose, however, with contradictory reports emerging from Hamas and Fatah as to who orchestrated the attack and the origin of the suicide bombers. In an effort to muddy the connection between the Rafah border breach and the Dimona attack, Hamas spokesmen Ayman Taha claimed the bombers were from the West Bank and had crossed into Egypt prior to the Gaza blockade. At the same time, Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas denied Al-Aqsa’s involvement in an effort to disassociate Fatah with the attack.
Fatah’s Fifth Column
Fatah’s military arm the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades fought for Fatah interests against Hamas in June 2007, losing control of Gaza, but defending Fatah’s authority in the West Bank. However, the restoration of the peace process and President Abbas’ reliance on Western governments produced a division between al-Aqsa’s Fatah-aligned cells and its more radical factions. Thus, al-Aqsa officials in Gaza provided specific details about the operation and released a video of one of the attackers standing in front of a Fatah banner, while West Bank spokesmen unequivocally denied involvement.
Though Israeli and PA leaders said the peace process would move forward, Israeli spokesman Mark Regev acknowledged that President Abbas will face pressure to contain rogue militias operating in the territories. Today’s attack was the first attack claimed by an al-Aqsa splinter group since the December 2007 killing of two off-duty Israeli soldiers in the West Bank.
A Look Forward
The Dimona attack added credence to Israeli concerns that the limited security at the Rafah Crossing and porous Israel-Egypt border represent a threat to Israeli national security. Therefore, in the coming days, Israel will witness redoubled efforts to construct a border fence along the Israel-Egypt border, as well as renewed calls for Israel to reoccupy the Philadelphi Corridor along the Rafah border.
However, Israeli pressure on Egypt and President Abbas to rein in Palestinian insurgents will be fruitless providing the Gaza blockade remains in place. Egyptian citizens, and many of its soldiers, are sensitive to the Palestinian cause and view the Gaza blockade as inhumane. The Egyptian government, therefore, will continue to turn a blind eye when its citizens aid Gazans in an effort to preserve the support of its population. Likewise, President Abbas will risk losing popular support in the West Bank if he appears weak and unsympathetic to Palestinian suffering in Gaza.
Israel will therefore be faced with the options of either reoccupying Gaza or securing the Rafah border crossing or encouraging a negotiated settlement between Fatah and Hamas. Given that Israeli citizens adversely oppose negotiating with Hamas, increased military operations in Gaza, possibly leading to limited reoccupation, is anticipated in the near to mid-term.
