Highlights
• Explosions in Baghdad on November 23 and 25, 2007 broke the silence created by the successful institution of the US troop “surge,” the suspension of the Sadr militia, and thriving US-Sunni tribal council alliances.
• Despite these attacks, violence has subsided in Baghdad
• the US military gears up for the timely withdrawal of US “surge” forces.
• If al-Qaeda-linked insurgents perpetrated the attacks, they do not represent a long-term threat to stability. On the other hand, if Iranian backed militias are responsible, the attacks foreshadow a coming power struggle in post-US Iraq.
On November 23 and November 25, 2007, explosions rocked the increasingly peaceful streets of Baghdad, Iraq. The explosions combined to claim the lives of 25 and injure at least 44. The attacks came on the heels of a demonstrated decline in bombings and sectarian violence in Baghdad. A US military spokesman told reporters on November 24, 2007 that four captured members of a splinter group of the Mahdi Army claimed responsibility for the November 23, 2007 attack on the Ghazli pet market, but no evidence was produced linking the two attacks.
The US military blamed Iran for funding the breakaway factions of the Mahdi Army. The suspects in the bombing indicated that the attack was designed to “demonstrate to Baghdadis the need for militia groups to continue providing for their security by mimicking an al-Qaeda in Iraq attack. Iran and its Iraqi ally, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, vehemently denied Iran’s involvement saying the accusations were simply propaganda and ignored contradictory reports concerning the bombers.
Subsiding Violence In Baghdad
The decline in violence is linked to three main factors:
• The successful implementation of the “surge” of 162,000 US troops in Baghdad in February 2007
• The suspension of the Mahdi Army on August 30, 2007 (Previous Report)
• The increased cooperation between security forces and Sunni, anti-al-Qaeda “Awakening Councils” across Iraq (Previous Report).
According to Major General Joseph F. Fil Jr., commander of the US forces in Baghdad, statistics show an 80 percent decline in murders and a 70 percent decline in Improvised Explosive Devise (IED) attacks in Baghdad since the “surge” began. Other US military statistics show a decline to less than one car bomb a day from a high of 44. In February 2007, the number of bodies found in the morning on Baghdad’s streets dropped from 35 to 5, and suicide bombings declined from a peak of 59 in March to 16 in October 2007.
Interviews with Iraqis living in Baghdad indicate that the lives of Baghdad citizens are slowly beginning to normalize. Approximately 20,000 Baghdadis returned home, but many arrived to find their homes occupied by squatters or remained internally displaced due to the sectarian homogenization of their former neighborhoods.
Considering the “surge” a success, the US is preparing to scale back its military presence in Iraq, enhance the role of Iraqi security forces, and switch the onus of its focus toward reconstruction and economic development efforts.
Implications of Bombings
The implications of the November 23 and November 25, 2007 bombings depend on who perpetrated the crime. If al-Qaeda-linked insurgents executed the attacks, the attacks can be shrugged off as a last ditch effort of a defeated foe. The attack means very little to the Iraq’s internal security dynamics and will have very little impact in the days to come.
On the other hand, if Iranian-funded breakaway factions of the Sadr militia did, in fact, carryout the attacks, the bombings foreshadow a future struggle for political supremacy in a post-US Iraq. It is likely that Shia leader Moqtada al-Sadr and Iran have chosen to cooperate with US efforts to secure Iraq in order to speed the withdraw of US troops from Iraqi soil. Once gone, the Shia militias will be faced with fewer challenges to exerting control over Iraq’s Shia dominated south and Baghdad neighborhoods; giving the conservative, Islamic militias greater influence over the Iraqi government.
In general, as Iraqi security personnel secure Iraqi neighborhoods, Iraqi militias and US-aligned, Sunni tribal councils will be faced with marginalization (Previous Report). These groups will either adapt to the new security environment by transforming into political parties or they will act, as in the scenario alleged above, to create instability. By creating instability, the militias will reinforce in the minds of their constituencies the necessity of their arms, and, by extension, their existence.