Editor’s Note: This report is the third installment of a five-part assessment of the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AOIM). The series assesses the group’s development and progress in the following five categories: attack strategies, counter-offensive tactics, cell and group dynamics, media relations, and future impact.
Part Three: Cell and Group Dynamics
Highlights
-The AOIM’s cell and group dynamics have not changed significantly from its former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) organizational structure: a decentralized network organized into various regions across Algeria
-The group has endured the removal of senior leaders over the last year, but it’s networked structure makes it resilient
-The AOIM will likely continue to maintain its cell and group dynamics, relying on enduring poor economic conditions and other factors to maintain a strong recruit base
The al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AOIM) group dynamics can be traced to its former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) organizational roots. The GSPC started as an Algerian insurgent organization organized along regional lines with a diffused leadership structure that leads to a small, national-level leadership cadre.
Since merging with al-Qaeda in September 2006, the group has experienced the loss of several high level leaders, but continues to adapt to Algerian security operations. (see Part One and Part Two).
In this report, we seek to examine the AOIM’s most current leadership and regional organization.
Leadership
Within Algeria, the AOIM’s leadership is divided primarily into the northern and southern overall regions with a national leadership cadre. The current AOIM national leader is Abdelmalek Droudkel (aka Abou Mossab Abdelwadoud). He also oversees operations in AOIM’s northern sector.
He is a former university science student and an expert in explosives, and serves as one of the group’s master bombmakers. Droudkel reorganized the GSPC as it folded into al-Qaeda in late 2006, and served as the primary advocate for renaming the group “AOIM” in January 2007.
Also located in the northern region is the group’s judicial and Islamic laws specialist, Ahmed Abou al-Bara, who is primarily responsible for ensuring that the group’s operations, strategies, and missions are in line with so-called “Shari’ah principles.”
The chief of the southern region is Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Belmokhtar was a longtime southern weapons smuggler who became a GSPC and then AOIM member, rising rapidly to oversee AOIM activities in his region. He also played a prominent role in managing the then-GSPC merger with al-Qaeda. As a former soldier he was an early Islamic fighter volunteer and allegedly fought with Osama Bin Ladin’s Arab volunteers against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. While a member of the AOIM, Belmokhtar has traditionally been independent, a reflection of his early experiences as a mujahedin and smuggler.
Despite reports indicating Belmokhtar has been killed or accepted amnesty from the Algerian government, we believe he is still the southern region’s most influential figure.
In addition to senior leadership, AOIM maintains a shifting cadre of other high and mid level leaders. Algerian security forces have maintained constant pressure against these individuals, resulting in successes in 2007:
•On October 7, 2007, security forces killed AOIM deputy chief Hareg Zoheir (aka Sofiane Abu Fasila), at a checkpoint in eastern Algeria. Zoheir is believed to be the mastermind behind the September 6 and 9 attacks (Terrorist Attack and Terrorist Attack).
•On April 27, 2007, AOIM senior leader Samir Moussaab (aka Samir Saioud) was killed during a clash with the military in the northern Boumerdas region.
Regional Zones
AOIM is organized around regions within Algeria – a reflection of its insurgent roots.
There are approximately seven territorial zones in Algeria, according to fragmentary information. A designated commander controls each zone. Each zone has a media and production unit, as well as a “Council of Notables,” which functions as an executive board for the zone’s operations. There are multiple outposts and arm caches in each zone so group members can move at anytime in the event of a military operation.
The seven zones are divided to form the basic southern and northern operating environments led by Belmokhtar and Droudkel respectively.
Due to several successful raids by Algerian security forces, communication between the zones has been poor, resulting in isolation and breakdown at the local level for some AOIM groupings. Also as a result, AOIM has had difficulty mounting coordinated operations against Algerian security forces.
The most significant and most active zone is the northern mountainous Boumerdes region, or Zone II. As stated, Droudkel leads this zone, with others to include Sadouai Abdelhamid (aka Yahia Abu al-Haithem), a former al-Qaeda ambassador to the GSPC. Abdelhamid has been sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison.
Zone II geographically includes Algeria’s major tourist, business, and economic sites, it is also the group’s most popular location for attacks.
While Zone II is most active and important for the AOIM, Zone IX is the group’s largest land geographical section.
It encompasses the long corridor down the middle of the country from north to the Sahara Desert and along the border with Mali and Niger. Mokhtar Belmokhtar leads this zone.
Zone IX is vital to AOIM operations because it is widely used for smuggling, drug running, and weapon sales. With the help of nearby Niger and Mali, Zone IX is used to funnel funds, weapons, and ammunition to the northern region. More importantly, it can deprive leaders, like Droudkel, in the northern region of key sources and resources, which has played a major role in the group’s recent fragmentation and splintering within the past months (Previous Report).
Lastly, Zone V is another prominent area for the AOIM. Located in Eastern Algeria, Zone V was commanded by Amari Saifi (aka General Abderrezak “El-Para”). Little information is known about Zone V’s operational functionalities; however, its proximity to Tunisia and Libya has facilitated the transfer of funds, supplies, and militants across borders.
Forecast for AOIM Cell and Group Dynamics
Algeria’s long and rich tradition of anti-colonialism, activitism, Islamism and resistance—and its horrific ten year civil war in the 1990s—make it a suitable environment for political violence for the foreseeable future. Uneven economic development and lingering poverty will ensure a steady stream of recruits, while local preachers, the Iraq war and Osama Bin Ladin videotapes will provide ample motivation for militants to consider attacks against both Algerian forces and foreign personnel and facilities.
We also note that a small percentage of foreign fighter volunteers in Iraq are Algerian. These returning jihadis’ will one day provide local AOIM cadres with additional skills and tactics that will challenge already under-resourced Algerian security forces and may make the last five years of this decade more violent than the first.
