Editor’s Note: This report is the second installment of a five-part assessment of the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AOIM). The series seeks to assess and analyze the group’s development and progress in the following five categories: attack strategies, counter-offensive tactics, cell and group dynamics, media relations, and future impact.
Part Two: Countering A Strong Offensive
Highlights
-Algerian police and security forces have been successful in countering AOIM attacks and foiling operations this past year.
-As a result, the AOIM has experience strong fragmentation and splintering elements within the group.
-The AOIM has had to develop and evolve its attack strategies in order to effectively combat professional counter-offensive efforts.
The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AOIM) terrorist group has been under increasing pressure as the group has battled Algerian police and security forces this past year. Whereas part one of the AOIM special series examined the organization’s evolving attack strategies and tactics, this segment details Algeria’s operational efforts—both proactive and reactive—against the group’s terror activities. With the help of neighboring security forces from Morocco and Tunisia, Algerian security forces have significantly contributed to the disruption of AOIM operations.
We believe security forces will continue to intermittently disrupt AOIM’s capabilities to conduct terrorists attacks, however, security actions will not be able to prevent attacks from occurring in the near-term.
Retaliation for Bouchaoui Attack
AOIM’s attack on Brown & Root Condor employees (aka “Bouchaoui Attack”) on December 10, 2006, raised Algerian, as well as North African attention as this was the first attack on Western personnel in the region . As a result, security forces across the Maghreb targeted a number of militants, who were either associated or members of AOIM.
•In January 2007, Tunisian security forces killed 12 Algerian terrorists and captured 15 after a battle in the northern border province. The militants had ties to AOIM and were involved in previous terrorist attacks in Algeria.
•In February 2007, Moroccan security forces arrested 32 AOIM members, who had crossed over into Morocco to conduct attacks. In addition, Algerian police killed 26 militants and dismantled a network of 27 members (including a French national and two Tunisians) suspected of funneling weapons to AOIM.
Prior to the Bouchaoui attack, the Algerian military, though still under attack by the then-Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), were not as focused on addressing the terrorist threat. The resurgence of military targeting came with the threat to Western lives and business interests in the country When AOIM conducted the Stroitransgaz attack on March 3, 2007, government security serviced intensified their focus on AOIM and their capabilities and intentions .
Algerian Security Forces Suffer Setback
After two successful months of rounding up terrorists, Algerian security and police suffered a setback during March and April 2007. Security forces arrested and/or killed 112 AOIM militants in January and February 2007 alone, but only five militants were killed during the months of March and April 2007. AOIM’s attack on the Russian gas firm, Stroitransgaz, on March 3, 2007, indicated to security forces the persistence of the terrorist group despite increased targeting and arrests.
•The launch of its Stroitransgaz operation, which resulted in the death of one Russian and three Ukrainians, clearly defined the AOIM’s capacity to revive itself and its resolve to fight for the jihadi cause.
Of note, Algerian security forces did not arrest or kill any AOIM members during March 2007. Moreover, the month of April 2007 was also difficult for the counter-terrorism effort. One of AOIM’s most significant attack operations, the suicide truck bombing on Algerian security forces and the Prime Minister’s headquarters, took place on April 11, 2007 . Although five militants were subsequently killed in the days shortly after the attack, the AOIM conducted a major blow killing 58 and injuring 166 in the attack against security forces.
Security Forces Respond
In the following two months after the April 11th attacks, Algerian military efforts proved highly effective against the AOIM. With 74 militants arrested and/or killed in May 2007, the Algerian military was able to capture a number of suspected suicide bombers tied to the April 11th attacks.
In May 2007, security forces and AOIM militants fought for several consecutive days resulting in the death of 27 insurgents, and limited casualties to Algerian security forces. Likewise, June 2007 Continued the security offensive with 22 militants arrested, seventeen of them in Spain and five in Mauritania. Algerian forces also claimed to have killed Ali Abu Dahdah, a well-known military commander of the AOIM.
Turning Point, and Start of Fragmentation
In July 2007, AOIM renewed efforts, coordinating and conducting the most attacks since March 2007, resulting in 11 people killed and 52 injured. However, Algerian security forces, were equally focused and experienced their most successful month in fighting the AOIM, arresting 67 militants and killing 85 others. Of particular success, was the seizure of AOIM related support material.
•During an investigation in July 2007, where 20 members were killed, Algerian security forces made one of their best findings – an AOIM laptop containing the names of approximately 572 AOIM operatives.
•The confiscation of this laptop is significant because it has enabled security forces to actively identify and pursue AOIM members prior to carrying out their operations.
It is important to mention that although AOIM carried out a number of attacks in July, the majority of these operations were before the confiscation of the laptop and the subsequent apprehensions.
•According to local Algerian reports, after finding the laptop a number of arrestees confessed the names and whereabouts of other members, which may have contributed to the large number of militants who surrendered themselves to the government, under Algeria’s amnesty program.
More importantly, the significant number of arrests, surrendering, and acceptance of amnesty among group members and even leadership, led to the fragmentation and splintering among the group’s leadership and core members alike.
A number of operations in August 2007, helped solidify the claims of fragmenting within the group’s leadership and organization.
•For instance, one of AOIM’s prominent military advisors, Rachid Sid Ali, and his aide were killed during a military operation, as a result of independent actions conducted without the approval of the group’s leadership.
•Similarly, in July, a prominent AOIM leader, Benmessaoud Abdelkader, surrendered to Algerian authorities, claiming that there was much tension within AOIM after the former-GSPC decided to join the ranks of al-Qaeda unilaterally.
Reviving the Jihad, Countering Security
Even though AOIM sustained losses in July and August 2007, with a combined total of 222 militants arrested and/or killed, that did not stop the group from renewing attacks in September 2007. With a number of events occurring – Ramadan, sixth anniversary of 9/11, and the group’s first year anniversary with al-Qaeda – AOIM conducted their most sophisticated attacks, in both number and tactics, in September. Algerian security forces were again in a reactive role as to the group’s effectiveness.
•Security forces have continued their efforts identifying several linked cells supporting AOIM’s September attacks, and have arrested and or killed an additional 38 militants
Tracking AOIM and counter-terrorism developments throughout this past year illustrates the fight against terrorism in North Africa is a cyclical phenomenon. Although Algerian security forces seem to be mainly in a reactive role in the fight against terrorism, we believe that Algerian security forces will once again become proactive in their pursuits.