Nearly a year and a half after Brazil’s most notorious and violent street gang First Capital Command Gang (PCC) began a systematic, armed campaign against Sao Paulo’s security forces, the Brazilian government has begun the process of reforming security. Much of the reform has been aided by US $3.28 billion security program meant to provide job training to troubled and susceptible youths and additional security training to the country’s police forces.
While the Brazilian economy has continued its impressive growth since President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva first took office in 2002, the country’s elevated murder rates, drug related violence and rampant criminality throughout it’s favela neighborhoods have largely gone unchecked. Gang related violence, which has flourished with the growth of narcotics trafficking, culminated in the May 2006 PCC urban terrorist campaign during which several Brazilian cities experienced an estimated 274 terrorist attacks directed at both the Brazilian government and security forces and the local Brazilian populaces. The PCC’s 2006 systems disruption campaign demonstrated the group’s growing capability and potential threat to the Brazilian state.
President Lula’s security program will only minimally reduce the level of violence throughout the state due to the delayed implementation of an aggressive security overhaul; however, we believe the duel economic-education reform policy in combination with more assertive police training and prison reform is an important first step.
Brazil’s Elevated Crime Levels
Brazil maintains the world’s fourth highest murder rate with an estimated 45,000 people killed each year, trailing only Colombia, Russia, and Venezuela, according to the Organisation of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture. Some Brazilian cities, such as Recife in the northeast, have homicide rates of around 80 per 100,000 people – twice as high as the most violent cities in the United States.
President Lula’s US $3.28 billion plan aims to improve the quality of policing throughout the state, specifically targeting the following areas:
• policing operations in the country’s favelas, where police corruption and heavy-handed police action is often reported;
• boosting social programs and education, seeking to narrow the burgeoning income gap that creates a breeding ground for crime and drug related violence; and
• building 160 new prisons to ease overcrowding in gang infested state jails.
Prison Reform Must Target Gang Activities
The rampant growth of criminal and narcotics gangs within Brazil’s prison system and the ability of these gangs to maintain criminal operations while incarcerated was demonstrated during the May 2006 PCC terrorist campaign. PCC leaders have established de facto control of local Sao Paulo prisons from which they continue to operate illicit enterprises. The state of Brazilian prisons in combination with the corruptible judicial system and inadequate security forces has allowed the PCC to create a substantial narcotics enterprise. The Brazilian populace has become the second largest consumer of Colombian cocaine behind the United States. Such addiction is largely attributable to the PCC’s targeting of Brazil’s impoverished youth as consumers of narcotics.
Any security program must seek to limit the level of gang activities in state prisons. The aforementioned ability of PCC and other Brazilian gangs to maintain criminal activities during their imprisonment and the high participation of correctional officers in these criminal rackets should be the primary target of proposed reforms. Brazilian correctional facilities have previously tried to isolate high-ranking gang members to limit their ability to organize and manage narcotics trafficking and other criminal operations. We believe this isolation policy has proven effective and should be accelerated in combination with constructing additional prisons to reduce overcrowding.
Economic Reforms in Favelas
Promoting security reforms while failing to promote economic and social reforms in the country’s impoverished favelas will do little to stem the overall level of violence. Increasing levels of income disparity reflects and accentuates the divisions within the general populace between the haves and the have-nots (Previous Report). Favela youths are an attractive target for the PCC and other gangs that offer camaraderie, social standing, economic incentive, and protection, while ensuring the continuance of violence. Incursions by the Brazilian authorities into indigent communities only increase the public’s sympathy and support of local gangs that are seen as protectors from the state security forces.
Police Reforms
Security forces view Brazil’s favelas as the land of no safe return, thereby necessitating violent incursions into these areas. Often the innocent inhabitants of these shantytowns are the victims of combat-like tactics being employed by the police. Previously, the Brazilian government and judicial system have acquiesced in these heavy-handed security operations, believing brute force alone was the cure to the country’s criminal groupings. However, as demonstrated, indiscriminate violence by police forces against the inhabitants of the favelas has turned large segments of the indigent community against the police, believing their presence brings more harm than good (Previous Report).
Brazil’s security plan will allow local police officers to qualify for a scholarship of up to 400 reais for additional training. Police forces will also be provided new equipment, including bulletproof vests, and undergo anti-corruption training.
Near-Term Outlook
We believe Brazil’s near-term security outlook will be mostly unchanged. The large push for security improvements, including better police training and reformed prison systems must overcome years of poor management and corruption while simultaneously battling an enemy that has become well entrenched in the favela communities. Any security program must be undertaken with a long-term commitment that seeks to improve social and economic conditions in the favelas while overhauling Brazil’s security forces and judicial system.
