Less than a year into office, Mexican President Felipe Calderon continues to combat Mexico’s drug cartels, breaking down political and security barriers that his predecessor, Vincente Fox, proved unable to transverse. Since January 2007, Calderon has dispatched some 20,000 Mexican military personnel and federal police to combat the cartel’s hired guns while inviting unprecedented law-enforcement and intelligence cooperation with the United States. As such, Calderon’s security initiatives and willing cooperation have gained the attention of the Bush administration and likely secured a US multiyear aid deal to assist the Mexican government in combating drug cartels.
US Congress and Mexican Populace
However, the proposed anti-narcotics aid legislation will face numerous challenges both in the US Congress and with ordinary Mexican citizens that remain suspicious of American meddling. In addition it remains unclear if Congress will approve another large-scale anti-narcotics aid package that provokes comparisons to Plan Colombia. Therefore, negotiations between the two governments have proceeded cautiously and discreetly, seeking to avoid outside influences that could negatively impact any agreed upon aid package.
Although neither the US nor the Mexican government has confirmed any ongoing negotiations, an official announcement could occur as early as August 20, 2007, when President Calderon is scheduled to meet with President Bush and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper for a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) summit.
Military Campaign and Cartel Pushback
The Mexican government continues to struggle to combat the country’s drug cartels that have gained control of drug trafficking into the US market. Since 2006, Mexico has suffered 3,000 drug-related killings, caused largely by an increasingly deadly turf war between the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels that are struggling for control of the US transport routes. According to the US State Department, 90 percent of the cocaine entering the US transits Mexico. In addition to cocaine trafficking, cartels produce a large share of the heroin and methamphetamines sold in the US, and Mexico remains the largest foreign source of marijuana into the US.
Calderon has impressed US government officials by his actions, including:
• dispatching 20,000 federal police officers and troops to six Mexican states to combat drug traffickers;
• forcing hundreds of senior-ranking police officials to undergo polygraph tests to assess their allegiance to the state;
• dismissing thousands of police officers for corruption or other crimes; and
• extraditing 16 major traffickers to the US for trial.
However, these initiatives have failed to decrease drug cartel activities in the short-term. Both the Calderon and Bush administrations are hoping additional financial resources will provide the Mexican military and police forces with the necessary training and equipment to effectively engage its powerful cartels.
Plan Colombia Comparisons Inaccurate
The proposed aid package will likely differ from Plan Colombia in several fundamental respects, including allocating funds for use in training, intelligence gathering and sharing and surveillance equipment, while Plan Colombia has focused largely on providing additional military equipment to the Colombian military. The aid package will also include increased training cooperation between US and Mexican armed forces. Since 2006, some 4,500 Mexican law-enforcement officers have been trained in counter-narcotics operations by US security forces.
In addition unlike their Colombian counterparts, Mexican military and police forces are not battling a guerrilla grouping that uses narcotics production to provide financial capital to their ideological struggle. Rather, Mexico is battling powerful drug lords that lack a larger ideological purpose – who in turn are also fighting amongst themselves for control of lucrative smuggling routes.
Healing an ailing US-Mexican security relationship will likely be a secondary benefit. Previously, US security officials have been reluctant to increase cooperation with their Mexican counterparts, fearing mass corruption within Mexico’s military and police forces. However, Calderon’s aggressive approach towards Mexico’s cartels has encouraged US officials to increase intelligence sharing and investigative cooperation.
USG and NGO Concerns Remain Valid
Concern among international human rights groups and US security and intelligence personnel remains high. Human rights organizations worry that additional aid will reward Mexican security personnel that engages in human rights abuses in their war against cartels. US security officials remain concerned that aid could assist corrupt Mexican police officers and troops that are wittingly providing both protection and intelligence to Mexican cartels for sizable financial rewards (Previous Report).
At this time it remains unclear how the US government will effectively monitor the use of financial aid by the Mexican government and security personnel. The US Congress will likely place conditions on the passage of any aid legislation, insisting US aid be used for professionalizing the Mexican police, that are currently deemed corrupt in both the US and Mexico. The US will also likely emphasize the rule of law through monetary infusions into Mexico’s judicial system and civil society and will likely call for the minimization of the Mexican military’s role in domestic law enforcement.
Urgent Supplemental Funds
The Bush administration will seek to increase aid to the Mexican government by fall 2007, seeking to take advantage of President Calderon’s request for assistance. This will require the Bush administration providing “urgent supplemental funds,” bypassing the appropriations process that could take over a year to pass an aid package, while simultaneously alienating the US Congress.
Long-Term Gains Minimal
However, without a larger regional strategy to combat the growth of cartels and drug trafficking groupings throughout Latin America, the US government will prove unable to effectively battle the fluidity of drug cartels. Should the Mexican government prove effective in combating Mexico’s cartels, we anticipate cartels dispersing trafficking operations to Central American states, particularly Guatemala, where Mexican drug trafficking groups have established relationships. Guatemala’s chaotic security environment would be beneficial to cartels that are seeking new bases of operation.
