Being named head of the Chechen resistance movement or separatist government is by no means a safe or ideal job, but that did not stop Doku Umarov from taking the position after Russia allegedly killed his predecessor Abdul Khalim Sadulaev in 2006. Unlike Sadulaev, who was a charismatic Islamic scholar, Doku Umarov is considered a veteran militant that has already fought two wars against Russia. Abdul Sadulaev had the goal of liberating the entire North Caucasus region under his leadership as the grand Imam.
However, when Umarov took power in June 2006, one of his first statements was seen as a return to reality, declaring it should be the number one priority of the resistance to combat “national traitors” and “collaborationists.”
Eliminate the Collaborationists
As president of the separatist Ichkeria government (which is currently not recognized by any state) and head of the resistance, Umarov, sees his greatest danger not from Russian security forces or the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership, but from fellow Chechens who may be willing to betray his presence to the security forces. Therefore, Doku Umarov has made it a priority to eliminate the collaborationists who may threaten the resistance movement. Umarov identified collaborationists when he was quoted as saying, “those working under cover of a civilian status, carrying out explosions and secret operations against us.” Umarov has not ruled out expanding the war throughout the North Caucasus like his predecessor Abdul Khalim Sadulaev did, but he is determined to keep his best fighters inside Chechnya to deal with those he claims, “are in service of the occupiers, whether in the military or civil capacity.”
In the last few years, the traditional prohibition of “Chechen killing Chechen” has largely been ignored, despite the unease it has caused several Chechen commanders. But with Umarov ready to make the elimination of fellow-Chechen collaborators or traitors part of his core policy, the situation is expected to get more chaotic as a wide range of new targets are identified. With the deaths of influential and charismatic leaders like Shamil Basayev and Aslan Maskhadov, several rebels have abandoned the resistance movement and have either joined the ranks of pro-Moscow Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov or simply just returned to civilian life. That being said, it has become a problem for the resistance to operate throughout the Caucasus because of the amount of distrust and questionable loyalty. But by no means does Ramzon Kadyrov have the absolute loyalty of all his security forces either, elements of which have greater loyalty and allegiance to local resistance commanders. Therefore, Umarov has had to rely on his regional local commanders to determine those who are genuine and those who are “traitors.”
What to Expect From Doku Umarov
Nikolai Patrushev, head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), is quick to credit the Russian security services with preventing large-scale Chechen terrorist acts in Russia since the Beslan school siege in 2004. Clearly, the Russian security services have recently been successful in the North Caucasus when top rebel leaders Shamil Basayev and Abdul Khalim Sadulaev were killed. But, it is likely that the Chechen rebel movement realized that attacks like that at Beslan, cause more harm than good to their cause. Umarov has seemed to adhere to this strategy by keeping the insurgency within the North Caucasus and to a lesser extent, Chechnya.
Doku Umarov is a soldier and to a lesser extent, a politician. He has a nationalist agenda and is currently not attempting to create a caliphate in the North Caucasus like several of his predecessors. In recent months, there has been an increase in attacks on the Chechen front. Doku Umarov largely shifted the resistance to focus on Russian military and police patrols in the region, as well as the “collaborators” and “traitors” working for Ramzan Kadyrov.
The Russia government touts as a success the fact that attacks on ordinary police patrols are down, but the militants have begun conducting targeted attacks against the Chechen Interior Ministry, as well as heads of other departments whose primary goal is fighting the insurgency. An example of this shift can be seen in the July 7, 2007 assassination of the Chechen deputy interior minister Akhmed Dakayev, who was shot and instantly killed.
It is expected that these kinds of targeting killings will continue. It is also expected that Umarov and his regional commanders will step up their attacks against Russian army patrols and local police loyal to Kadyrov.
