The Anbar Salvation Council, a coalition of anti-al Qaeda tribal leaders in the Anbar province, forged a strategic partnership with US forces in which intelligence sharing has morphed into military cooperation. Anbar Province, its capital Ramadi in particular, was previously an al-Qaeda stronghold. Since the US forces and the Anbar Salvation Council began to work together, however, the instance of attacks has declined dramatically. In February 2007, extremists in Ramadi on average implemented 30 to 35 attacks daily. In contrast, by late June 2007 the number was down to one attack a day, with a total of 50 days in which no attacks occurred.
In an effort to replicate the Anbar Salvation Council’s success, similar councils were formed among the tribal leaders in Diyala and Salahad Din Provinces. However, these new councils face different challenges than the Anbar Salvation Council. Unlike the relatively homogenously Sunni Anbar province, Diyala is evenly comprised of both Sunni and Shia tribes; representing 25 major tribes and 100 minor tribal offshoots. Though more homogenous than the Diyala province, the Salahad Din Salvation Council is also comprised of multiple tribes, among which it is struggling to reach consensus.
We believe that the Diyala and Salahad Din councils, although newly formed, may unify and strengthen in the coming days.
Reaction of the Maliki Government
Despite the positive impact of the US-Anbar Salvation Council alliance, the US’s decision to fund and arm the Sunni tribal coalitions has been controversial. On June 22, 2007, Prime Minister al-Maliki countered rumors that he opposed the arming of Sunni tribes in a statement saying,
“The government does not fear the arming of the tribes, but it fears chaos and lack of discipline and the emergence of new militias. Everything must be done under the auspices of Iraqi sovereignty and government supervision and within a national context.”
The primary Shia parties in Parliament, the Dawa Party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), are wary of a future in which the US withdrawals its military and the armed Sunni tribes transform into Sunni armed militias. SIIC in particular, along with the Sadr Current political party, opposes the reversal of the de-Ba’thification law. It perceives the Sunni tribal leadership’s alliance with US forces to be a measure through which the Sunni tribes have sought to circumvent the de-Ba’thification law.
Response by ISI Aligned Sunni Insurgent Groups
The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) (an al-Qaeda linked umbrella organization) felt the initial impact of the US-Sunni tribal alliances. It has responded by both focusing its efforts on assassinating tribal leaders and releasing video statements that its targeting of fellow Sunni Muslims will stop when the council members cease their attacks on ISI insurgents; it also released statements calling for all claims against it to be addressed privately through its judicial system. Both reactions are evidence that the US-Sunni tribal alliances are at least moderately effective and placing increased pressure on the ISI.
Non-ISI Sunni Insurgent Group’s Response
For their part, non-ISI aligned Sunni insurgents are wary of being connected to the Salvation Councils. Though many fighters from the 1920 Revolution Brigade fought alongside the Diyala Salvation Council with US forces in Operation Phantom Thunder, the 1920 Revolution Brigade quickly released a statement countering accusations that the group as a whole had allied with US forces. In fact, the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI), the 1920 Revolution Brigade, and Ansar al-Sunna have all sought to define themselves as decidedly against the US presence in Iraq in order to maintain the support of their constituencies. Hence, these groups may be willing to accept weapons and funding from the US behind closed doors, but will not openly ally with the US in the near to long-term for fear of internal division and collapse.
The Future of Sunni Tribal Coalitions
The US will experience increased success in the near-term as a result of the reliable intelligence its allies provide. However, Iraq’s 150 tribes are self-interested and territorial. In periods in which the central government was weak, Iraqi tribal leaders have instituted customary law to govern their provinces; a practice supported by Saddam Hussein following the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
As the tribes grow in wealth and influence, the central government loses authority to govern on the local level. On the other hand, the al-Maliki government is ineffective. It frequently refuses to pay the salaries of government employees in the Sunni provinces and has failed to pass key legislation that would serve to both unite the nation and increase its legitimacy.
Therefore, in the absence of a strong central government, provincial authority will increase and the Sunni tribal coalitions will prove valuable in securing and moderating the provinces. However, their success will further delegitimize the unproductive central government. In the long term, Iraq’s central government will as a result be faced with two options:
• Form a federation of semi-autonomous provinces with a weak central government, or
• Assert its authority by implementing its laws and establishing the authority of its courts militarily.