In a predictable (Previous Report) but nonetheless startling development, The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) has routed the Fatah affiliated Palestinian Preventive Security Forces and taken military control of the Gaza Strip. Stationed in the Fatah dominated West Bank, Palestinian President and Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas has responded by outlawing the Hamas Executive Force and other militias affiliated with the group. Abbas has also dismissed the Palestinian Unity Government and installed an emergency cabinet, effectively isolating Hamas from the national government.
Given the fluid environment on the ground and the myriad of local and international forces at play, we predict the following scenarios could occur in the Palestinian Territories over the next 3 to 6 months – ranked from most to least likely:
• Most Likely: Hamas and Fatah govern separate territories
• Possible: Resumption of a unity government
• Least Likely: Civil War spreads into the West Bank
West Bank First Strategy
Abbas has moved quickly to consolidate his control over the West Bank – dismissing the unity government, outlawing Hamas militants, and taking preventive measures to stop the spread of violence into the West Bank. In naming an emergency government comprised of independent technocrats and headed by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a western educated and respected economist, Abbas has succeeded in restoring international support and critical aid to the Palestinian Authority. The US and Israel intend to prop up the Abbas government in a ‘West Bank First’ strategy that ideally demonstrates to the Palestinian people benefits of a secular, cooperative approach (source).
While Fatah and the international community are prepared to continue delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza’s 1.5 million residents, Hamas will be isolated as it governs an overcrowded, desperate territory wedged between a cautious Egyptian government and Israel. Jumpstarting the Gaza economy under these conditions is an almost insurmountable task for Hamas, though the group may bring much needed law and order to the territory. However, the situation in Gaza will likely grow direr, potentially leading to Hamas attacks on Israel as means of diverting attention from its failed governance. An isolation policy will also likely lead to increased influence for Iran and Hezbollah in Gaza, and an atmosphere of chaos that al Qaeda can exploit.
Reconciliation
Though unlikely, the rhetoric stemming from either side does not preclude the possibility of a reconstituted unity government. Hamas officials claim the unity government is still legitimate and that Abbas’ decision to dismiss it was a “mistake” not allowed under Palestinian Basic Law. Further, Hamas alleges its military action in Gaza did not target Fatah but those forces working against the unity government and collaborating with the US and Israel. Though acknowledging Hamas control of Gaza, Abbas – as head of the Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization – shows no inclination to permanently cede Gaza or divorce the territory from a future agreement on the contours of a Palestinian state.
Of most importance, it is in the domestic and regional interests of Arab governments to support a ‘Palestinian cause’ and not choose sides. Egypt often serves as mediator between the two rivals, and Saudi Arabia has a vested interest as the key facilitator of the Mecca Accord that preceded the unity government (Previous Report). Moreover, restoring a unity government will help limit Iran’s growing influence with Hamas and in Gaza, a key concern of regional Sunni Arab actors.
Ultimately, however, any resumption of the Palestinian unity government is likely to be temporary. The divisive issues separating Fatah and Hamas are systemic, ideological, and beyond short-term solutions (Previous Report).
Civil War Spreads
The following factors will likely prevent the civil war from spreading into the West Bank: Fatah is a dominant political and military presence in the West Bank; Israel has a significant military presence in the West Bank and controls its borders; and the international community is committed to seeing the West Bank succeed under the leadership of Abbas.
If the Gaza situation grows increasingly dire, Hamas may seek to divert attention by attacking not only Israel but the perceived collaborator regime in the West Bank. Pockets of political and military support for Hamas in the West Bank are the likely sources for potential civil unrest. Though unlikely, Hamas elements could adopt an Iraq or Afghanistan insurgency type campaign to disrupt and pressure the West Bank government. If civil war does indeed spread throughout the Palestinian Territories, a reluctant Israel or international force would likely be deployed to stem the chaos.
