In a continuation of the fighting between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Army that was ignited on May 20, 2007, the Lebanese Army shelled Fatah al-Islam positions in the Nahr al-Bared camp on the fifteenth day of fighting. Fighting between the two sides has been interrupted by brief cease-fire agreements that permitted almost 30,000 of the refugee camp’s 40,000 Palestinian refugees to flee the ongoing assault (Previous Report).
The distinction between the military reality on Monday, June 4, 2007, and the previous days is that a new front opened Sunday night in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in the southern city of Sidon.
At the onset of the conflict, Fatah al-Islam’s threats to spread its offensive to targets beyond Nahr al-Bared appeared to be empty. Since the issuance of United Nations Resolution 1701 declaring the state’s sole right to govern and police its territory, Palestinian militant groups embedded within Lebanon’s 12 Palestinian refugee camps have sought to maintain a low profile. Immediately following the army’s initial clashes with Fatah al-Islam, local sheikhs and representatives from Fatah, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), and other smaller Palestinian insurgent groups residing in Lebanon released statements condemning Fatah al-Islam. The majority of Palestinian groups in Lebanon maintain this stance, but there is growing support among Palestinian residents for the group, who consider them their only defense amidst the army’s shelling campaign.
Sunday night’s skirmish in Sidon’s Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp took place between the Lebanese military and members of Jund as-Sham, another Salafi jihadist movement, following the announcement that Abu Riad, a senior member of Fatah al-Islam died in clashes in the Nahr al-Bared camp. Fatah al-Islam spokesman Abu Hureira denied a connection between the two groups saying that Jund as-Sham was, “not fighting on our behalf.” He reported that members of the two groups were related through marriage, but a member of Jund as-Sham in Ain al-Hilweh relayed that they are in fact of the sleeper cells referenced by Fatah al-Islam in threats to export violence throughout Lebanon.
Sovereignty Over Security and Defense
Clashes between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam are one of many battles in which the Lebanese government is fighting to establish rule of law in a country of fiefdoms. The military, therefore, must win a decisive victory over these “terrorist gangs.” A clear victory will not only bring some stability to the war torn refugee camps, but it will also serve as proof that the Lebanese Army is trained and equipped, contrary to Hizballah claims, to safeguard Lebanese territory from foreign invaders.
Hizballah is anxiously watching the conflict unfold. The Lebanese military’s inability to defend itself against the onslaught of Israeli attacks during the summer 2006 Israel-Lebanon War gave further support for Hizballah’s argument. Should, however, the Lebanese Army demonstrate itself to be effective against Fatah al-Islam, Hizballah will be faced with tougher questions concerning its refusal to disarm.
Syria is also anxious concerning the outcome of the current conflict. Many Lebanese blame Syria for allowing Fatah al-Islam and other terrorist organizations to take root in the Palestinian camps. Following the February 14, 2005, assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiik Hariri, United Nations (UN) resolution 1559 declared that the Lebanese government is the sole sovereign and legitimate authority over its official institutions of governance. Prior to Res. 1559, the Syrian military and intelligence officers governed Lebanon through a mafia-style system of threats, assassinations, and imprisonments. The enforcement of Resolution 1559 resulted in the April 2005 withdrawal of Syrian troops and officers stationed along the Syrian border and embedded within the Lebanese government.
Syria has since been implicated in approximately 20 bombings and other efforts to destabilize Lebanon, such as Hizballah’s attack on an Israeli convoy and kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers that led to the July 2006 Israel-Lebanon War. The Syrian government and its officials relied heavily on the bribes and taxes it imposed on Lebanese merchants and citizens. It is, therefore, in the best interest of Syrian officials that the Lebanese government and military remain incapable of policing its territory.
The Hariri Tribunal
Since Hariri’s assassination, many Lebanese factions subsequently formed the March 14 Coalition and have fought for justice for his murder. From the beginning the investigation into Hariri’s death was inhibited from being carried out properly. The UN investigation into Hariri’s death implicated several senior Syrian officials, which Syria has refused to extradite. On May 30, 2007, the UN passed a resolution calling for the establishment of an International Tribunal into the Lebanese Prime Minister’s death. Syria and pro-Syrian Lebanese officials oppose the establishment of the tribunal, but the March 14 Coalition and anti-Syrian parties’ welcome its establishment as an opportunity for justice and a step toward regaining Lebanese sovereignty.
Looking Forward
The Lebanese Army is determined to defeat Fatah al-Islam and other antagonist groups. The head of the Lebanese Armed Forces projected that fighting will continue for this week, but the end result will be a Lebanese victory. If the Lebanese Army does defeat Fatah al-Islam and the Hariri Tribunal pushes forward, increased bombings and targeted assassination should be expected in Lebanon. Public gathering places, government buildings, and governmental officials will continue to be the primary targets.
As the fighting in Nahr al-Bared rages on for another week, there will be increased unrest among displaced refugees. The majority of these refugees, however, will not fight along side Fatah al-Islam. In order to facilitate an end to the conflict, insurgents from Fatah and Hamas may join up with the Lebanese Army. The group may win some victories, but the end result will be their defeat and the return of stability to Lebanon’s Palestinian camps, even if it requires the deaths of all of Fatah al-Islam’s members.
