Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ended his extended absence from the public spotlight on May 25, 2007, when he reclaimed his position at Kufa’s primary mosque. Sadr’s sermon was decidedly against the occupation, calling for the immediate withdraw of foreign militaries from Iraqi territory. Sadr also continued his call for Iraqi unity in his sermon.
The much-discussed reform of Sadr’s political party, the Mahdi Current, began to take shape during a Sadr movement’s convention on Saturday, May 26, 2007. Rumors point to the Sunni Tuwafaq bloc, the Allawi bloc, and the Fadhila Party to join with the Sadr Current in forming a new coalition to counter the Dawa Party, Prime Minister Maliki’s party.
Unifying Goals
The Sadr Movement and its Sunni counterparts have multiple shared goals that compel them to form a coalition.
• First of all, they are all in opposition to Prime Minister Maliki’s government (Previous Report). The Sadr movement and the Sunni parties support an immediate withdrawal of foreign militaries from Iraq, and, therefore, see Prime Minister Maliki and the Dawa Party’s support of US military operations in Iraq as inexcusable.
• Secondly, neither the Sadr Current nor the Sunni bloc support a Federal system comprised of semi-autonomous states. In contrast, the two sides agree that the country should be ruled by a strong central government. This central government would serve as a unifying force and would prevent the Kurdish north from forming an independent Kurdish state, which would incidentally include commandeering Iraqi’s richest oil fields.
• Third, both sides champion national reconciliation.
Obstacles to the Coalition’s Formation
Despite Sadr’s overtures of unity to the Sunni minority, the Sunni bloc remains skeptical regarding the Shia cleric’s intentions. The two sides have a long history as bitter enemies that was ignited on February 23, 2006, with the Askariya shrine attack in Samarra, which led to the death of thousands of Sunni and Shia faithful. The Sadr movement has moved to halt its operations against Sunni insurgents since its agreement to support the Baghdad Security plan’s implementation, but segments of the Mahdi Army continue to target Sunnis despite Sadr’s orders to stand down.
Sadr has dealt with dissenting factions of his Mahdi Army by dismissing at least 600 insurgents across Baghdad. However, discharging Mahdi members has not led to their standing down from the battle. Many continue to present themselves as members of the Mahdi Army despite visits from the army’s leadership forbidding them from doing so.
Also, insurgents professing to be members of the Mahdi Army continue to threaten and evict Sunni families from majority Shia cities. The Mahdi Army is notorious for coercing monetary support from the civilian Shia population, which they visit door-to-door to collect once a month. On these visits, insurgents accuse individuals of spying for the Maliki government and threaten Shias for talking to their Sunni neighbors. Such activities, whether carried out by the official Mahdi Army or dissident factions, is detrimental to the movement’s ability to ally with Sunni parties, much less court Sunni insurgencies like the 1920 Brigades and the Islamic Army of Iraq.
Finally, the Sadr movement supports the de-Baathification law that prohibits Sunni employment in public offices and the military, which the Sunni bloc staunchly opposes. In fact, the Sunni bloc sees the implementation of de-Baathification as evidence of religious discrimination in the Iraqi government and has, as a result, threatened to leave the government on multiple occasions.
A Way Forward
Although the two sides’ history and major political discrepancy would suggest an alliance is out of the question, Hussein al-Falluji and other prominent members of the Sunni bloc say closer ties between the movements is a possibility. The Sadr movement began to engage both the Sunni bloc and its nationalist insurgent groups in informal discussions prior to Sadr’s return to Najaf, so it is assumed that the cleric’s return is designed to step up negotiations. These negotiations will undoubtedly be tedious and fraught with distrust.
Moreover, upon returning to Najaf the cleric hopes to combat dissent among his leadership and reassert authority over the Mahdi Army. He has managed dissident opponents through dialogue, and also action, having tipped off members of the US forces to the whereabouts of rebellious leaders (resulting in last month’s roundup of Mahdi Army insurgents). Using the US military, even for purging rogue factions, will not be viewed positively and may lead to continued loss of respect among Mahdi Movement leadership.
In the end, if the Mahdi Movement, the Sunni bloc, and other Shia parties form an alliance in opposition to Prime Minister Maliki’s government, its success will only be temporary. The differences among the parties and their bitter history will resurface and cause discord in time.
However, if the newly formed bloc first achieves its goal of taking over the majority and bringing down Maliki’s government, as well as forcing the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq before collapsing, it will have been successful in accomplishing its goals.
It is more likely that the Sadr movement and the Sunni insurgent groups will form a loose alliance in which they cooperate on some political plans but never form a strong, unified alliance. Nonetheless, a small amount of collaboration and dialogue between the two sides will be a monumental step forward toward national reconciliation.
If the parties and militias do in fact work together to root out the al-Qaeda presence in Iraq and end the party-sponsored sectarian violence, it will be a sign of hope for a post-US military Iraq.
