After September 11, 2001, sea ports were identified as a possible means of entry for Islamic terrorists to smuggle radioactive materials into the United States (US). Ports are a vital component to the US economy and process over 80 percent of US trade. However, the high volumes of intermodal cargo that were unmonitored for dangerous materials has caused authorities to implement the use of radiation detection equipment at major US ports.
The current system of intermodal cargo monitoring lacks updated technology and efficient detection methods and leave the US vulnerable against the smuggling of dangerous materials. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to assess and correct this weakness. DHS has selected the Port of Tacoma, Washington, as the recipient site for its Rail Test Center (RTC). The project, put into practice under the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE), will evaluate concepts and technology at the port. If DHS is successful in establishing efficient methods at Tacoma, the techniques will be implemented throughout ports across the country within the next few years.
A Perfect Fit for Assessment
The Port of Tacoma should serve as an optimal facility for the project. With four intermodal dock yards Tacoma processes 70 percent of its cargo directly from ship to rail. Authorities have assessed that freights are most vulnerable when transferred from the ship to the rail and as such the RTC will be utilized to conduct scans at the following stages of transfer:
• Arriving on the dock
• Transported to the rail yard
• At entry into the rail yard
• In the container storage stack
• During train assembly
• Once the train exits the port
The RTC will also introduce new and advanced radiation detection systems. Currently, scanning of intermodal cargo is conducted manually and can be a time consuming process. Trains are only checked as they are exiting the yard. If a radioactive signal is detected, unloading the train manually is very costly to companies as other transfers are delayed to inspect the suspicious train. But with a series of early checkpoints, newly advanced equipment could accurately scan cargo before it is prepared to exit the yard, further ensuring a thorough and steady transfer process.
Additional Work Abroad
Although DHS has taken an important step to update US port security against radiological and nuclear smuggling, additional work remains to ensure that technical requirements are introduced aboard.
• According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study on maritime security, the Department of Energy (DOE) is working to prevent smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. In the 2003 Megaports Initiative, DOE devised a plan to implement radiation detection equipment at major foreign ports. In 2007, radiation detection systems have successfully been installed at nine ports including the port of Qasim, Pakistan and a port in Manila, Philippines. Expanding on this initiative, DOE has also solidified agreements with 15 countries for implementation, most notably in Colombia, China, the United Kingdom, Egypt and Mexico. An additional 20 countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East are currently in negotiations with DOE for future installation guidelines and programs.
Remaining Challenges
Until DHS can disseminate updated operational techniques to US ports across the country, the threat of smuggling radiological and nuclear materials by rail cargo remains a threat. In 2005, according to a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), authorities confirmed 103 incidents involving illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials. Most recently in 2005, 3.3 grams of highly enriched uranium HEU was reported missing in New Jersey. Although the majority of the 103 incidents in 2005 involved no criminal activity, the incidents highlight vulnerabilities in tracking disposed materials.
According to the maritime security report conducted by GAO, the following challenges remain when implementing detection systems at home and abroad:
• Environmental conditions at foreign ports may pose a challenge to implementing the detection systems. High winds and water spray at these ports could alter radiation reading levels. Future agreements, should require proper construction of shields for the equipment to ensure accurate readings.
• Due to a low emitting level of radioactivity, HEU is difficult to detect. Illicit traffickers may attempt to conceal HEU’s low level of radioactivity by surrounding the substance with a highly dense layer of material such as lead.
• Operations at Tacoma will determine the effectiveness of the new detection technology, as no international technical requirements currently exist for radiation detection. By implementing systems abroad, US agencies need to collaborate on the necessary minimal standards for equipment used.
Future Impact
Under the SAFE Act, DHS plans to apply the new technology at 22 of the busiest US ports by September 2007. The operations at Tacoma will have a heavy impact on meeting these deadlines. If the operations validate the potential capabilities of multiple checkpoints with new radiation equipment, the threat of dangerous materials reaching US soil by means of rail cargo will be greatly reduced.
While the upgrades in rail monitoring offer a production and security boost to US ports, implementing the systems abroad could take agencies many years to complete.
