Iraqi Prime Minister Nour al-Maliki’s prodding is one of several factors that led the United States to begin diplomatic dialogues with Syria and Iran concerning the future of Iraq and securing its borders.
Following the May 4, 2007, close of the Iraq Conference in Sharm al-Shaykh, and as a result of the sideline discussions and chance
meetings that took place therein (Previous Report), there was a noticeable change in the US’ position toward Syria and Iran. US Secretary of State’s tone toward the Syrian regime changed from that of holding Syria solely responsible for stopping the flow of mujahideen across its Iraq border to saying that the US hopes to “cooperate” with Syria toward accomplishing this aim. The two sides began to discuss future talks with the US emphasizing cooperation and co-responsibility and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad approached the topic cautiously stressing that Syria never supported insurgents in Iraq.
Regarding Iran, though the US and Iran did not hold formal discussions in Sharm al-Shaykh, the conference was an opportunity to direct contact with Iran, who the US holds responsible for destabilizing the region and supporting terrorism. A week later, the US announced on Sunday, May 13, that US Ambassador to Iraq Crocker and his Iranian counterpart would meet in Baghdad within the next few weeks.
Recent changes in diplomatic tone and approach over the last few weeks indicate that the US intends to implement at least some portion of the December 2006 Iraq study Group findings relating to strengthening of regional ties and engagement with Syria and Iran.
Implications: US-Syria Relations
Future US-Syria talks will be limited to discussions concerning the security of Iraq in the near term. Though the two parties accept they must work together in Iraq, they continue to disagree concerning Syrian involvement in Lebanon, the Golan, and the imprisonment of prominent Syrian Human Rights activists.
There is also little indication that talks between the US and Syria concerning Iraq will have any impact on either country’s positions concerning the implementation of an International Tribunal into the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiik Hariri (Previous Report). On May 10, 2007, a week after the landmark talks between Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moualem and US Secretary Rice took place, Syrian President Bashar indicated in a Syrian Parliamentary session that “any cooperation requested from Syria (by the international tribunal), which could compromise our national sovereignty is rejected.” The US, on the other hand, supports Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s government and will uphold its commitment to support the implementation of an international tribunal into Hariri’s death. (On the same day, a Syrian court sentenced Kamal Labwani, the founder of the Syrian opposition party the Democratic Liberal Gathering in Syria who was arrested in November 2005 after meeting with White House officials to 12 years in prison for meeting with a foreign state “to encourage it to attack Syria.”)
Implications: US-Iranian Relations
US-Iran relations will remain caustic. The US’ decision to open the lines of communication with Iran is not representative of a general policy shift toward Iraq. Outside of measures to facilitate a better security situation in Iraq, the US and Iran remain at odds concerning Iran’s nuclear program and the arrest of US-Iran intellectuals in Tehran earlier this week. In fact, the announcement that the US ambassador will be meeting with Iranian officials was prefaced by US Vice President Cheney threatening the Iranian leadership with military repercussions if Iran acquires nuclear weapons capability or tried to close the Strait of Hormuz to oil shipments (Previous Report).
Regional Implications:
Saudi Arabia: US support of Iraqi PM al-Maliki in spite of his close relationship with Iran and allegations of supporting human rights violations of Iraq’s Sunni minority worries Saudi Arabia. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the former Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s declaration that the entire Middle East will become one Islamic Caliphate ruled by an Iranian Persian ayatollah, Middle Eastern regimes have feared the spread of Iranian influence in the region, and the affect Iranian religious expansionism might have on local Shia populations. Saudi Arabia and Egypt in particular have been impacted by Iranian attempts to stir up sectarian strife in their domestic politics through Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) orchestrated bombings and rallying of their Shia minorities.
Saudi King Abdullah recently refused to meet with PM al-Maliki during the Iraq conference and has also rejected US President Bush’s request for a State Visit this summer. Saudi Arabia continues to support the Sunni minority officially and nationalist Sunni insurgent groups unofficially. If the US begins to hold talks with Iran, Saudi Arabia will be increasingly concerned and will act accordingly.
Saudi King Abdullah has already built a permeable wall along the Iraq-Saudi border in order to stem the flow of trucks containing weapons or insurgents into Saudi Arabia. In the future, if Iran continues to gain influence in Iraq and the Iraqi government does not pass necessary reforms to better incorporate Sunni Iraqis into the political system, Saudi will become increasingly antagonistic toward the Iraqi government. Saudi will continue to refuse to forgive Iraq’s enormous debt in order to exert pressure on the Iraqi government to enact reforms, as well as begin to openly support Sunni interests and activities.
Egypt and Jordan have taken measures to stem the growing Iranian influence in Iraq by closing its borders to Iraqi refugees (the majority of refugees were Sunni which raised concerns that the Sunni minority was being depleted). Like Saudi, Egypt and Jordan have a history of supporting Iraq’s Sunni minority financially and will continue to do so with increasing measure in the coming days. A worst-case scenario is that the two countries will begin deporting Sunni Iraqis back to Iraq in order to bolster the Sunni population.
Looking Forward:
The US will limit its discussion with Syria and Iran to issues surrounding Iraq in order to mitigate the impact to its relationship with its long time allies in the region. All sides will posture in order to maintain face and to enter negotiations from a position of power, but in the end a secure and stable Iraq is in everyone’s best interest, so they will cooperate toward advancing that goal.
Iran, however, is a possible dissenter, as it may see the security vacuum in Iraq as its opportunity to expand its influence in the region. As the Iranian regime postures to block power-sharing reforms and the national hydrocarbon draft law (Previous Report), the region’s Arab countries, minus Syria, will move to strengthen security alliances and form counter-Iran power blocks.
In the past, the US sponsored a ‘balance of power’ strategy known as the “Twin Pillars” to counter a growing Iraqi threat to regional stability during the Nixon administration. The Twin Pillars policy armed Iran and Saudi in order to facilitate the creation of a regional block that was militarily capable of countering Iraqi military strength.
Similarly, if the security situation in the region continues to move sideways—with no stability in sight—the Gulf Cooperation Council could expand to include Egypt and Jordan forming a Sunni Arab alliance to counter Iranian influence.
