On April 24th, 2007, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed a new requirement that nuclear construction firms be required to take into account safety measures for commercial air attacks when planning new reactors. A preliminary tally of 4-1 indicates that the measure is likely to pass during the official vote scheduled for later this year. Critics, including the one dissenting vote in the initial proposal, stated that the NRC is adopting too much of a “hands-off” stance regarding reactor safety requirements.
The Chernobyl Legacy
The disaster at the Chernobyl, Ukraine nuclear power plant has been a case study in reactor superstructure safety since 1986. Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (RFAEA) nuclear safety requirements were significantly lower than NRC requirements at the time, leaving the Number Four reactor at Chernobyl highly vulnerable to its inevitable disaster. The primary safety measure neglected at the Chernobyl plant was a containment apparatus: an encasing structure typically constructed of concrete and steel that includes a dome protecting the reactor from leaking radiation in the case of an accident. Failure to include a containment structure at the Chernobyl plant resulted in the emission of plutonium, iodine, strontium, and cesium, all radioactive elements, across a vast, populated area.
Applying the Chernobyl legacy to the commercial air threat, the result of an unprotected or minimally protected reactor could be catastrophic when coupled with fuel or explosives-laden aircraft(s).
Airliner vs. Containment Structure
NRC officials have routinely expressed their confidence in the integrity of US containment structures. Although there are no specific regulations governing the construction of these shields in avoidance of airline attacks, studies performed by NRC scientists show current reactors to be capable of withstanding a commercial aircraft collision. With existing regulations calling for steel and/or concrete containment structures sufficiently robust to contain any emergency radiation emission at a range of 60 to 200 psi, experts conclude that the blast emanating from the impact of a fully fueled airliner would be containable.
Regulations Reapplied?
Further regulations regarding structural durability for nuclear reactors on the surface seem excessive and unnecessary if NRC estimates are accurate. The 2001 attack on the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers lends credence to the notion that this enemy needs to be regarded as not only resourceful and adaptive, but highly capable. If nuclear facilities are already meeting the standards by which the NRC estimates adequately defend against a commercial air attack, it would appear only prudent to officially adopt them.
Enforcing regulations on nuclear facilities with regard to kamikaze aircraft is an appropriate course of action, however redundant it may seem in light of current study results. Suggesting that reactor builders take terrorist attacks into consideration when making construction plans allows for the possibility that safety measures might be sacrificed to cost-efficiency. A regulation mandating this would alleviate any non-compliance.
At present, this issue is one of balancing probability and consequence – although the likelihood of another commercial air attack is relatively low, the consequence is significant.
