When the ballots were tallied in Syria on Thursday, April 26, 2007, the National Progressive Front (NFP), which is dominated by the Baath Party, maintained its majority in Parliament. This is the expected outcome in Syria, a country whose constitution demands that the NPF occupy two-thirds of Parliamentary seats (167 out of 250), with the Baath Party guaranteed 52 percent (131 seats) of the NPF’s quota. The remaining one-third (83) seats are allocated to “independent” candidates, who are vetted and then cleared to run for office.
The end result is that all candidates for Parliament have demonstrated explicit support for the Baath party and President Bashar al-Assad. Since the outcome of the election was predetermined, a low percentage of eligible voters in Syria participated. In fact, 4.10 million out of 7.4 million (56.12 percent) of Syria’s registered voters took part in the election. The picture is bleaker than these numbers would suggest, however, because not all of Syria’s 12 million eligible voters are registered. If eligible voters are taken into consideration, voter turnout was only 34 percent.
Syrian Election Reform and the Opposition
On January 3, 2007, a much anticipated amendment to the Syrian Election Law was passed. Human rights activists and a few vocal members of the Syrian opposition anticipated that the amendment would include an increase in the seat quota allotted for Independent Parliamentary candidates. However, the amendment did not address quota disparities in Parliament. Instead, the amendment allowed independent candidates to promote their agendas and raise funds on state run media outlets, at the same time it limited campaign spending to SL3 million (US $57,000).
From the outside looking in, a move to allow independent candidates to advertise on state-run television station may seem like a step in the right direction, but because all candidates are pre-approved by the Baath the move has little impact. The amendment’s capping of campaign spending may have one of two motivations: to inhibit the US and other foreigners ability to influence independent candidates or to prevent wealthy businessmen from dominating elections. Either way, the law is counterproductive for opposition voices.
The amendment to the Election Law fell well short of the opposition’s expectations, and was seen as yet another blow to their once high expectations for President Assad’s promising attitude toward political and economic reform. In fact, Syria witnessed two phases of President Assad’s interaction with the opposition. The first, the “Damascus Spring” in 2001 was a period in which President Assad allowed human rights activists to print a list of desired human rights laws (comparable to a Bill of Rights) in Sana, Syria’s state-run newspaper. The activists followed the first list of demands with a longer, more hostile list and what followed was the “Damascus Winter,” the imprisonment of a large number of human rights activists. Continuing to stifle opposition voices, President Assad also arrested two key members of the opposition who were vying for office a week prior to the elections.
A Missed Opportunity
The US described the Syrian election a “missed opportunity.” United Nations and unilateral US sanctions, along with efforts to isolate Syria, have served to validate President Assad’s continued use of wartime powers (which were instituted by President Hafez al-Assad during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War allotting the President exclusive near complete authority over domestic and foreign policy). The inability for both internal and external actors to pressure the Syrian government to reform its electoral system ensures another Syrian Parliament devoid of opposition voices.
No Changes on Horizon
Rather than vote for pre-approved pro-Assad candidates, the opposition staged a boycott of last week’s elections. The boycott, however, does not change the reality on the ground. President Assad continues to enjoy unchallenged authority and the US, multi-nationals and regional governments will continue to have little to no impact on the Syrian regime unless President Assad agrees to negotiate. Until that time, true election reform and funding the Syrian opposition will have to wait.
