Iraqi Prime Minister (PM) Nouri al-Maliki took office on April 22, 2006. At the time, then US Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad said that al-Maliki “(had) a reputation for being a strong leader, a patriotic leader, without being subordinate or having strong ties to any of the regional players.” Just seven months later a leaked memo from a US high-ranking official expressed doubts over, al-Maliki’s commitment and ability to push necessary reforms through the Iraqi Parliament. Now, over one year later, US officials involved have changed, but the argument remains the same in Baghdad.
Primary US Concerns
Since taking office on December 6, 2006, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has taken a tough yet necessary stance toward advances the US wants the Iraqi Parliament to undertake. Prior to meeting with al-Maliki in Baghdad on April 20, 2007, Defense Secretary Gates told reporters that he wanted to convey to the Iraqi PM that the US’ commitment to Iraq is not “open-ended,” as evidenced by current debate in the US Congress. Gates delineated a “to-do” list for the Iraq Parliament including:
• Passing laws to regulate foreign investment in Iraqi oil and the dispersion of oil revenues
• The rollback of the De-Baathification Law
• New power-sharing legislation to define how powers are divided between regions and the central government
• Setting a date for provincial elections
Though draft laws were passed in late 2006 and early 2007 to address the rollback of the De-Baathification Law and the distribution of oil revenues , months later, and over two months into the US troop surge, no further actions have been taken to pass the drafts into law.
Al-Maliki Struggling to Maintain Power
Secretary Gates did not specifically blame PM al-Maliki for the lack of political progress on these issues, but the under current was noticeable in Baghdad as the struggling Iraqi PM fights to hold parliament proceedings amidst bombings and internal political strife. Seen by many in Iraq as being US led, al-Maliki relies heavily on the US’ security commitments. Unfortunately, as the security situation in Baghdad, the Diyala province, and Sadr City deteriorates and the US military proposes controversial security barriers, al-Maliki has little bargaining power remaining with ministers calling for immediate US withdrawal.
The Baghdad Security Operation was initiated in hopes that the city would finally experience relative peace and security. Since its implementation on February 14, 2007, the Baghdad Security Operation’s primary successes have been linked to Sadr’s decision to cease sectarian-rooted jihad operations (Intel Report, Intel Report). However, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) bombings targeting the Baghdad Security Operations and members of Parliament have continued unabated .
On April 10, 2007, the US military commenced the construction of a three mile concrete wall that when built would surround the Adhamiya district of Baghdad. After its construction, residents would enter and exit the district through controlled security checkpoints. A US spokesman said the Adhamiya wall, and others scheduled to be built like it, are intended to, “break the cycle of sectarian violence.” By building concrete blast proof walls, the US military hoped to increase the defensibility of Baghdad’s small minority enclaves.
However, the reaction among the residents of Adhamiya and the Sunni population was one of outrage. Adhamiya’s Sunni residents took to the streets on Monday April 23, 2007, calling the security wall collective punishment and pledging allegiance to al-Maliki. Iraqi politicians also said the barriers would only serve to intensify sectarian divisions, and PM al-Maliki said it reminded Iraqis too much of “other walls”, referencing the Israeli-Palestinian wall. In the wake of collective outrage and PM al-Maliki’s call for the construction of the wall to halt, a US military spokesmen said construction would stop and the US military would remain in dialogue with parliamentarians.
Making Do
Despite the US government and al-Maliki’s attempts to shift the blame for the lack of improvement on the ground in Baghdad and Iraq proper, in the end they have no choice but to work together. Growing US impatience with the Iraqi Parliament is reciprocated by the Parliament’s disappointment in the US military’s inability to provide the promised security enclave.
However, in the current security situation in which both Sunni and Shia insurgent groups are dividing internally over increasing degrees of extremism and willingness to use chemical weapons , Iraq’s only hope is for the politicians and the US military to work together. Though the US is closely observing al-Maliki’s performance, there is a lack of alternate options to bridge current divides.
Though the sectarian and political divisions among Iraq’s parliament are rooted in decades of oppression and human rights violations, when faced with the imminent withdrawal of the US military, mass emigration and displacement, and progressively more violent attacks against Iraqi citizens, the Parliament will have to compromise and pass the necessary legislation to ease political tension and make necessary political improvements.
