Popular support for Thailand‘s junta-installed government has diminished in recent months, and increasingly is marked by public protest. These shifts in sentiment are in response to policy missteps, inability to deliver basic services, and foot-dragging on restoration of civilian democratic rule by the military that took power in 2006. In a sign of growing unease, junta leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin requested that emergency rule be imposed in Bangkok to clamp down on protesters. Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont—himself appointed by General Sonthi—rejected the request; highlighting apparent differences between junta leaders.
Growing Dissatisfaction
Anti-junta protests, though still modest, have grown in size and vigor. Protesters include former Prime Minister Thaksin supporters, members of the upper middle class, and pro-Democracy advocates. Several specific government missteps form the basis of Thai’s increasing dissatisfaction with their military leaders:
• Government reluctance to detail corruption allegations against Thaksin—the core justification for the coup against him;
• Economic policy missteps followed by abrupt ousters and resignations among the government’s economic policy leadership;
• No apparent improvement in combating an intensifying Malay Muslim insurgency in the south;
• Building Thaksin loyalist and Muslim insurgent threats in Bangkok;
• Little movement toward a restoration of democracy; and
• Infighting and dissonance within the government.
Following Prime Minister Chulanont’s rejection of General Sonthi’s request for emergency rule in Bangkok, police estimate that roughly 2,000 protesters rallied Friday outside Bangkok’s municipal centre, calling for the junta to step down. Both the call for Emergency Rule and its subsequent rejection likely energized the anti-junta groupings in and around Bangkok.
Pressure Valves
In an attempt to reassure Thais, Chulanont recently announced a September referendum on the redrafted Thai constitution, to be followed by December parliamentary elections. It’s unclear whether the promise of late year political reform will diminish anti-government sentiment. One sticking point is the potential a future constitution will contain language strengthening the role of Buddism in Thai life–a move certain to inflame Thailand’s southern Muslim insurgents.
Forecast: Unrest and Insurgency
We believe the foul political mood permeating some portions of Thai society will likely spread: and we predict a long hot summer. We expect increasingly violent protests, a predictably repressive government response (Thailand has a history of demonstrations end in bloodshed), and more attacks by Muslim separatists in Bangkok and the south.
Malay Muslim separatist insurgents, and to a lesser extent potential Thaksin loyalist insurgents, will likely be emboldened by and seize upon this climate and momentum of popular anti-junta protest and perceived government instability to press attacks against the government. A more violent ‘new guard’ of militants driving the Muslim separatist insurgency in the south will likely exploit the government’s less aggressive counterinsurgency operations against the insurgent powerbase in the south to continue to escalate their offensive campaign there. Further, this new guard’s escalation of the insurgency has increased the potential that insurgents will open a new front against Bangkok.
We don’t rule out a countercoup but believe countercoup forces lack the capability in the near term to take on the junta without additional and more focused social unrest. The nucleus of a countercoup would likely involve Thaksin loyalists aligned with emerging (and opportunistic) groupings in the military and police, drawing popular support from Thaksin’s rural and poor powerbase, and possibly aligning with some anti-junta/pro-democracy activists.
Until high-profile and clear progress is made by the government in stabilizing the economy, combating the Muslim insurgency, moving toward the restoration of democracy, and improving its governing faculties and decisions, this climate of rebellion against the junta, and its potential violent elements and instability will continue to intensify. The window for the junta and its government to make such pivotal and redemptive progress is quickly closing, despite promises in September and December. The coming summer—and the presence or lack of organized unrest—will likely reveal what may happen by year’s end.