Sri Lankan defense forces reported an air attack on March 25, 2007, which targeted the Katunayake Airport and resulted in the deaths of three of their airmen. Non-functioning, Indian-installed RADAR systems gave little warning of what was later discovered to be a strafing and bombing run by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), fighter jets on runways and hangars of Sri Lanka’s only international airport. Although the damage was minimal, the reality of the terrorist organization’s new air capabilities has yet to be fully appreciated. LTTE is well known to be an adaptive and technically adept organization, utilizing to great effect cyanide pills, suicide bombs, and open attacks involving well-trained militias and naval assets. The LTTE’s new air capability poses a challenge Sri Lanka forces.
Acquisition
LTTE’s newly dubbed “Air Tigers,” the organization’s aviation capability, was purportedly prepared years in advance of the attacks. Initial reporting that the aircraft used in the attack were likely smuggled into the country in kit form and assembled over a two to three year period. Currently, it is unknown whether or not the terrorist group is constructing more fighters or actively maintains more than the two involved in the attack, but both possibilities are highly likely. The relaxed security screening during the 2004 tsunami relief effort is popularly thought to have been the timeframe that the LTTE smuggled the aircraft.
Aircraft Details
Photographs published on the LTTE website suggest that the camouflaged planes used in the airport attack are upgraded craft of a Cessna-style variety with a two-person cockpit and stationary landing gear. Homemade modifications are evident including a crude bomb rack and equipment enabling automatic weapons firing. Each plane appears capable of carrying four crude gravity bombs equipped with release mechanisms and stabilization apparatuses. As fitted, a single LTTE plane is capable of causing minimal to moderate equipment damages and personnel casualties. Effectiveness is currently decreased by homemade equipment, modifications and munitions, but could be improved with significant upgrades.
Implications
LTTE’s aircraft acquisition improves their insurgent capabilities. These improvements may inspire other insurgents to procure similar capabilities. The LTTE’ will use their newly acquired air capability with effect, and will likely seek to manufacture more aircraft. Reprisal attacks by the government and additional LTTE attacks will continue to create chaos in the country. Some form of autonomy will likely be the only deterrent to continued attacks on Sri Lankan civilians, political figures and military assets by the LTTE. However, it is doubtful that this will occur in the near term.
