In the past two weeks, Mogadishu, Somalia has experienced the most severe violence since the country fell into anarchy in the early 1990s. The recent chronology of events in Somalia, starting from Wednesday, March 21st through Saturday, April 1, 2007, reveals much about the violence in the capital. Disloyalties between ruling and warring clans account for much of the heated fighting, as well as providing al-Qaeda with a two-part convenience: a distraction to infiltrate the fight and a scapegoat to further their own agenda in the country. We believe that unless Somalia’s clashing clans can reach a sufficient resolution, which focuses on battling the insurgents instead of each other, fighting will continue to increase significantly and incorporate more overt al-Qaeda elements.
Chronology of Events
Violence in Mogadishu has been steady with daily insurgent attacks on Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian troops since the African Union (AU) forces stepped into the war-torn nation March 1, 2007. However, the past two weeks have been unusually violent:
• March 21: Insurgents drag mostly TFG soldiers’ bodies through Mogadishu during heavy fighting between them and allied forces. At least 16 are killed . The incident resembled 1993’s ‘Blackhawk Down’ event. The incident set the stage for the proceeding two weeks.
• March 22: Al-Qaeda instills Aden Hashi Ayro, 30, an Afghanistan-trained commander who heads the Islamists’ military wing, Shabab, as its leader in Mogadishu. Also on this day, heavy fighting breaks out between Mogadishu’s largest, most powerful clan, the Hawiye, and TFG/Ethiopian forces .
• March 23: A cease-fire agreement is reached between Ethiopian forces and the Hawiye, however, it only lasts five days before TFG and Ethiopian forces break the truce with early morning raids on March 29 .
• March 25: Al-Qaeda’s media production wing, al-Sahab, releases an inspirational video message by famed militant leader, Shaykh Abu Yahya al-Libi, calling for more brutal attacks on all foreign and non-foreign forces impeding on Somalia’s jihad efforts (Previous Report).
• March 30: Ethiopian helicopter is shot down, confirming the insurgents growing strength and the allied forces inability to fight back .
• April 1: Ugandan peacekeeper is killed in fourth consecutive day of fighting . The first AU peacekeeper casualty since the 1,400-Ugandan force entered March 1, making it more difficult to reach the 8,000-troop size limit initially agreed upon in January 2007.
Clashing Clans
The clan dynamics in Somalia have added a significant amount of pressure to the conflict between the allied forces and the insurgents because traditional clan loyalties have shifted dramatically since the Islamists were defeated last year. The largest and most powerful clan in Mogadishu remains Hawiye, however a branch of this clan has now joined forces with the Islamists.
The TFG does not consider the Hawiye a terrorist clan, however, the government is skeptical of its involvement in the peace process in Mogadishu since the TFG’s long-time enemy clan, the Habr Gedir, is a branch of the Hawiye.
Leaders from the Hawiye clan met with a number of Ethiopian troops on March 22, 2007, and agreed on a cease-fire, which lasted five days. However, the TFG announced that it would not recognize an agreement between the foreign force and a Somali clan, and thereby ified the cease-fire, in effect, initiating another brutal wave of ongoing attacks.
The most recent attacks have occurred in southern Mogadishu, where the Habr Gedir clan dominates. Criticized for supporting radical elements of the Islamists’ militia, the Habr Gedir has long been an enemy of President Abdullahi Yusuf’s clan, the Darod. The TFG is predominantly made up of Darod, which has caused much concern over the loyalties of the TFG.
Many Somalis believe the government is more loyal to the Darod than to the well-being of Somalia and, thus, refuses to support the government.
These “clashing clans” have made it virtually impossible to trust one another, even those in the same clan find it difficult to pinpoint where their loyalties lie.
To the Benefit of al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda’s installation of Aden Ayro as the leader of al-Qaeda in Mogadishu, followed by the video airing of the al-Qaeda terrorist al-Libi has left the terrorist network sitting back and watching the outcome. With the allied forces’ focus on how to appease clashing clan loyalties, al-Qaeda has benefited from having the spotlight on someone else. Using the internal conflict as a distraction, al-Qaeda has been able to coordinate and infiltrate easily with the insurgents. However, the TFG has caught on quickly, warning residents in Mogadishu to leave their homes as soon as possible because they “have to get rid of the al-Qaeda elements in the area,” and civilians may be targeted (source).
The conflict between the clans also benefits al-Qaeda because it provides a scapegoat for fighting any forces that may impede on the terrorists’ jihad in Somalia. In the video message released last month, al-Libi called on terrorists to fight those who will slow them down, align with government forces or try to assist the nation.. Al-Libi’s wide description includes both foreign and non-foreign targets, which will likely continue to stir up additional violence and hatred within Somalia in the near to long term.