As the foundation of the international arms control regime, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the most widely adhered to arms control agreement on record. Following the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York, the relevance of the treaty gained a sense of permanence as the 170-plus countries in attendance voted to extend the treaty indefinitely, sans conditions or restrictions. This historical vote clearly reflects the importance states have placed upon the treaty and its continued success. It also illustrated their desire to permanently codify the stigma associated with nuclear weapons and their usage within a legal, albeit nonbinding, structure. As a result, the success of the NPT has been successful as the total number of nuclear weapons states continues to remain below the levels proliferation forecasters initially predicted.
However, the same NPT-regime that induced the voluntary forfeiture of nuclear weapons stockpiles in Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine has since witnessed a marked decrease in its ability to achieve compliance; a fact evidenced by the ongoing nuclear concerns with rogue states such as North Korea and Iran. In response to this apparent challenge to the NPT’s viability, two distinct assessments of the underlying cause and requisite corrective actions have emerged. Proponents of one option have argued that a state’s desire to secure nuclear capabilities stems directly from its perceived insecurity and therefore the overall reduction/elimination of all nuclear weapons, including those held by the Permanent Five (P-5) on the United Nation’s Security Council, would elicit the desired effects. On the alternate side, however, others maintain that the lack of enforcement powers embedded within the NPT necessitates the need for the world’s leading states to maintain a credible deterrent; one capable of persuading rogue states to abide by international law. A quick look at the US’s proposed Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program provides an even clearer depiction of the issue at hand.
The RRW Program Debate
According to a US Congressional Research Service report, the RRW program was developed to, “improve the reliability, longevity, and certifiability of existing [nuclear] weapons and their components.” Since the post-9/11 global security structure no longer requires a nuclear-strike strategy based on the redundant saturation of an enemy’s territory, the RRW program provides a means through which the US may transform its existing legacy arsenal into a more robust force equipped with anti-tampering measures and reduced payloads as part of the “New Triad” envisioned in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.
Not surprisingly, the two groups discussed above have assumed decidedly different stances in regards to the controversial RRW program.
• Those that have called for the reduction/elimination of all nuclear weapons have branded this program as a provocative offense and decried that such overt measures aimed at sharpening the US’s nuclear spear will only serve to further increase the insecurity of the world’s nuclear “have-nots,” and aspiring nuclear powers.
• Conversely, proponents argue that the decreasing deterrent capabilities of Cold-War era nuclear weapons have caused the NPT’s relevance to decline. These individuals believe that the nuclear devices envisioned through the RRW program would remedy the situation and re-cast the NPT with a credible deterrent for the future.
Ultimately, the ability of RRW programs to deter rogue states and strengthen the NPT must be greater than the likelihood of other states seeking to secure their own nuclear weapons capability.
The Way Forward
Even though Iran and North Korea will likely cite the RRW program as a symbol of US ‘hypocrisy’ and use the program to justify their pursuit of nuclear capabilities, such statements demonstrate the ability of the RRW program to capture their attention. The real predicament entails convincing the other NPT signatories about the value of the RRW program. In order to do so the US will have to:
• Convince other states that rogue regimes represent a valid threat to the international community.
• Assure the international community that it is willing to act in the interest of all states, not only in the interests of itself.
• Make other states understand that the RRW-program was developed in response to maintenance and deterrence-related concerns.