The current political and legal crisis gripping Pakistan, provoked by President Pervez Musharraf’s suspension of Pakistan’s top judge on dubious allegations of nepotism and abuse of power poses the most significant challenge to Musharraf’s regime since he took power in a 1999 coup. Following the suspension, several clashes between judicial and opposition protesters and Pakistani police ensued.
The protests at present represent a democratic institutional and societal rebuke against Musharraf’s perceived creeping autocracy. The crisis will likely weaken Musharraf’s power, regime, and standing in upcoming elections. But the protests and activism are not yet so broad-based within Pakistani society as to represent a fundamental political threat to Musharraf’s hold on power in the near to mid term.
However, pivotal catalysts that might escalate the crisis into a broad-based opposition of Musharraf’s hold on power in the mid to long term include:
• Increasingly energized grassroots activism and political maneuvering of opposition parties in seeking to use the current crisis as a springboard for cultivating a wider movement against Musharraf;
• A lack of effort or ability on the part of Musharraf to quickly resolve the crisis;
• And/or the continued heavy-handedness of Musharraf’s police forces against protesters.
The crisis is a result of underlying societal and institutional discontent of Musharraf’s autocratic eight-year reign, and the further erosion of democratic institutions. These dynamics suggest that civil society and opposition political forces in Pakistan are likely to use the crisis to build political momentum toward checking and counterbalancing Musharraf in upcoming elections.
A Judicial Thorn in Musharraf’s Side
The current crisis was sparked by the ouster and subsequent house arrest of Pakistan’s Supreme Court Chief Justice, Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, on March 9. Chaudhry was accused by Musharraf’s government of a series of relatively minor illegalities in corruption-plagued Pakistan, including nepotism and use of vehicles and aircraft to which he was not entitled. However, most observers believe the independent-minded Chief Justice was removed because his human rights, public interest, and civil society investigative and legal posture would continue to pose constitutional and institutional challenges to Musharraf’s autocratic maneuvering.
Musharraf is seeking to be re-elected as president by the outgoing legislature, rather than the incoming one, as well as attempting to remain head of the military despite earlier promises to the contrary. In addition, a key constitutional crisis is also brewing with regard to Musharraf serving as both the president and chief of the army. In 2003, Parliament authorized Musharraf holding both offices, but this provision expires when his term ends in October 2007. Many observers believe that Chaudhry, as Chief Justice, would have heavily scrutinized and possibly objected to these issues, challenging the legitimacy of Musharraf’s rule. Further, Chaudhry had recently pressed Pakistan’s powerful and untouchable intelligence services to respond to allegations that they were illegally holding scores of “disappeared” individuals. With Chaudhry’s removal, Musharraf likely is seeking to influence the judiciary into acquiescing to Musharraf’s powermongering.
Chaudhry’s case is currently being reviewed by a panel of senior judges.
Street Protests
Chaudhry’s ouster provoked mass street protests by Pakistani lawyers, opposition political parties, and civil society activists who viewed the removal as a brazen attempt to muzzle the judiciary. At least 14 superior and civil court judges have resigned over the crisis, as well as one of Pakistan’s deputy attorney generals, Nasir Saeed Sheikh. Musharraf responded to the protests with police to clear protesting lawyers, ransacked a private television station that had covered the rioting, and arrested anywhere from 450 to 1000 opposition supporters involved in rallies against Musharraf.
Pakistan’s main opposition parties have seized on the crisis as another example of Musharraf’s growing autocracy, and have staged rallies protesting the removal of Chaudhry. The two main opposition parties are the Pakistan People’s Party, headed by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and the Pakistan Muslim League, headed by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The opposition parties said they would stage protests under the joint banner of the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy. Most of the opposition supporters arrested over the weekend by Pakistani police are from the Pakistan People’s Party and a faction of the Pakistan Muslim League. To date, the rallies have proceeded without major incident, a possible sign that Musharraf is seeking to avoid further confrontations with protesters that might exacerbate the crisis.
Forecast: Musharraf Endures….This Time
Musharraf, his regime, and its political standing will emerge from this crisis weakened. If Chaudhry is found guilty, it will be perceived as a trumped-up ouster, a puppet judiciary, and another sign of Musharraf’s autocratic abuse of democratic institutions. If he is acquitted, Musharraf will have suffered a significant blow to his authority, and Chaudhry will be reinstalled as a major challenger to Musharraf’s autocratic designs. Because the crisis remains relatively limited in its base of support within Pakistani society—currently mostly involving lawyers and opposition parties—it is unlikely to fundamentally threaten Musharraf’s hold on power in the near term.
In the coming days and weeks, Musharraf’s focus will likely be on salvaging as much political power from the crisis as possible, and attempting to stanch any expansion of the crisis into a broad-based opposition movement against his regime. Avoiding further heavy-handed confrontations with protesters and opposition elements, and making efforts to resolve the crisis will be key for Musharraf in attempting to de-escalate the crisis before it expands into a larger movement. However, the recent mass arrests of opposition protesters may have moved the crisis past the brink of possible de-escalation. To avoid this, some reports hint that Musharraf may be looking to cut a backroom power sharing deal with the opposition parties in order to temper their rallying activitism against him.
Civil society and opposition forces have been energized by the current crisis and opposition parties are poised to leverage it to rally a mass opposition movement against Musharraf, taping into these deeper veins of discontent with the President. These political opposition forces smell blood from Musharraf’s wounded political authority as a result of the crisis, and are likely to press the movement’s momentum to challenge, check, and counterbalance Musharraf’s loosened stranglehold on power in upcoming elections.