Hamas is sending dozens of militants from the Gaza Strip to Iran for extensive military training, according to Israel’s internal security service, Shin Bet. Intelligence chief Yuval Diskin assessed this development as a “strategic danger,” more serious than Gaza’s prolific weapons smuggling (source).
Though specific documentation was not presented, there is ample circumstantial evidence to support the charge. The impact of Quartet (EU, UN, US, Russia) sanctions has indirectly strengthened the Hamas-Iranian relationship, furthering Iran’s ideological and strategic interest in maintaining influence over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Islamic Republic has also historically trained and employed terrorist proxies to pursue its foreign policy goals.
The significance of Israel’s accusation was augmented by the public manner in which it was issued. In choosing a rare Shin Bet press conference with the foreign press, Israel’s message targeted an international community thus far withholding judgment on a forthcoming Palestinian unity government and a hesitant ally in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
A Likely Supposition
With traditional Arab state supporters of Hamas mostly stymied by the Quartet’s economic blockade of the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, Iran has exploited the ‘sponsorship’ void and increased efforts to smuggle funds into the Palestinian Territories. Tehran’s support of Hamas serves both its ideological and national interests. Anti-Israeli sentiment remains a cornerstone of Iran’s revolutionary identity and anti-Israeli activity brings the Persian state legitimacy and acclaim among the Arab public in the Middle East (Previous Report).
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) coordinates a regional terrorist infrastructure, including the Palestinian Territories, to counter Iran’s conventionally superior enemies with an asymmetric threat (Previous Report). Iran has traditionally funneled money and weapons to Palestinian terrorist groups via its proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the past, the IRGC has also facilitated the transfer of wounded Palestinians to Iran for medical care and subsequent ideological and military training (source).
Iran’s courting of Hamas is not a new development. Indeed, Shin Bet allegations concerning Hamas training camps on Iranian soil stretch back to the mid 1990s (source). Iranian aid to Hamas, along with other Palestinian terrorist groups, increased with the outbreak of the 2000 Al-Aqsa Intifada. For Iran’s support during the Quartet blockade, Hamas leaders have pledged to launch attacks against Israel should Israeli or American forces strike Iran’s nuclear facilities (Previous Report).
Targeted Announcement
Israel’s public intelligence briefing asserting Iran’s military training of Hamas was a calculated demonstration aimed at reaching and influencing two key audiences: the Quartet and Saudi Arabia.
The charge casts further aspersion onto Hamas just as the group is attempting to form a unity government with Fatah. Israel opposes the outlined platform of the developing unity government, and rightly fears that Hamas’ refusal to recognize Israel will do little to prevent either Russia or the EU from ending the economic embargo (Previous Report).
By highlighting the Hamas-Iran connection, Israel is also encouraging Saudi Arabia to become more engaged in the peace process. Iran’s influence over Hamas, and in turn the Palestinian Authority, comes at a zero-sum loss to its traditional patron in Riyadh. As a reminder to Riyadh of Iran’s destabilizing role in the region, the Israeli briefing occurred one day after Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s historic visit to Saudi Arabia.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the charge concerning Hamas and Iran will not derail the development of a Palestinian unity government. In fact, it could have the opposite effect by convincing certain Quartet members and Saudi Arabia that engagement of the new government is necessary to coax Hamas from the Iranian orbit.
However, the charge will induce the Israeli goal of increased Saudi involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Despite their dismay over the Saudi brokered Mecca Accord (Previous Report), Israeli officials believe Riyadh is interested in regional stability and could have a moderating influence over the Palestinian crisis. Indeed, both President Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni have recently cited the 2002 Saudi Peace Plan (with key modifications) as a potential basis for restarting peace talks with the Palestinians.
