On February 9, 2006, over 700 UN peacekeepers stormed one of Haiti’s most dangerous slums, Cité Soleil. The operation was part of an extended effort on behalf of the UN to rid the seaside slum of one of Port-au-Prince’s most notorious gangsters, Evans Tikoutu. Despite a prolonged campaign, the peacekeepers were unable to apprehend Evans. During the operation three people were killed and seven injured. This recent UN operation highlights the increasingly unwieldy nature of gang violence in Haiti, an issue often manipulated for political leverage by high-level government officials. Haiti’s long-standing gang problem, coupled with an extended UN presence, is unlikely to remedy long entrenched problems of poor governance, poverty and criminality in the Western hemisphere’s poorest country.
The UN Mission in Haiti
Peacekeepers under the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)—6,800 troops and nearly 2,000 soldiers—arrived following a military coup that removed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from power in 2004. The mission, recently renewed by the Security Council, has yielded mixed results. While MINUSTAH has provided a measure of stability in a country where security is virtually non-existent, critics have accused the mission as being ineffectual and even counterproductive. Last year, Haitian strikes in protest of the UN mission brought Port-au-Prince to a standstill.
The difficulties faced by the UN’s Haiti mission emphasize the complex nature of the MINUSTAH mandate. While the United Nations has 15 peacekeeping missions around the world, its mission in Haiti is uniquely challenging. Haiti is the only UN mission where international troops routinely engage with armed criminal elements. David Wimhurst, spokesman for the UN mission, stated in a recent interview with the New York Times, “We normally deal with rebel groups or armed factions who have leaders and have agreed to disarm or enter into a political agreement. Here, none of that is true. They’re just a bunch of gangs who fight us.”
Political Dimensions
The UN mission in Haiti, as well as its current anti-gang offensive, is unlikely to be effective in the long run due to various political and economic factors. As a result of Haiti’s limited and ineffectual institutions, powerful Haitian gangs have supplanted the government in slums, where they are able to provide the social and civil services to poor residents. In addition to the de facto legitimacy accrued by these groups, government complicity in criminal activities has played an important part in the growth of these gangs. Haitian politicians have long courted favor from established gangs. It is believed that Aristide cultivated the favor of gangs in order to wield greater political power.
The proliferation of Haitian gangs has resulted in waves of kidnapping rings throughout Port-au-Prince. While kidnapping was not a serious security problem several years ago, Haiti has now bypassed both Mexico and Colombia to become the kidnapping capital of the world (Previous Report). Several factors have contributed to the intensification of kidnappings in Haiti. It is believed that kidnapping for ransom is an important source of political financing. In Haiti, there are few legitimate ways to fundraise since 65 percent of the functional budget is generated from international coffers.
Furthermore, the unsuitability of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs is a significant barrier to the successful incorporation of criminal elements into traditional Haitian society. While these programs have been successful in other countries, experts believe that they are not well suited to Haiti’s gang culture. Experts believe that the youth of many gang members and their criminal experiences—prolonged exposure to killings, torture, and rape—require more extensive treatment than is provided under traditional DDR programs.
Looking Ahead
While political violence has decreased under the administration of President Réne Préval (Previous Report), high poverty levels, unemployment and illicit narcotics have aggravated the growing crime dilemma. It is necessary to remove entrenched street gangs from Haiti’s slums; nevertheless, the current UN offensive against Haiti’s most notorious criminal elements is unlikely to have long-term effectiveness. Although it may eliminate an important source of Haiti’s violence and kidnapping epidemic, this offensive is likely to create a power vacuum, which will simply be filled by other violent criminal elements. It is more important to address the root problems of this crisis, including government complicity in gang violence. Only when politicians cease manipulating gang members and their power bases as pawns in a political power game can Haiti and its international allies successfully address the deep-seated problems of poverty and crime.
