An estimated 50,000 people have been killed as a result of insurgencies in India?s northeast region since the country?s independence in 1947, and separatist insurgents operating there seem intent on adding to this number in 2007. Insurgents belonging to the most prominent ethno-nationalist, separatist group, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) , which is fighting for an independent homeland in Assam, have stepped up attacks in recent weeks. To date, the ULFA insurgency alone has killed more than 20,000 people since it began in 1979.
The central motivating grievances of the ULFA centers on the perception that the Indian government is plundering the resource-rich Assam region without due benefit and government neglect to local Assamese who are ethnically closer to Burma and China than India. In the most ferocious violence, suspected ULFA guerrillas killed upward of 70 Hindi-speaking migrant laborers?seen as outsiders responsible for taking jobs?in a wave of attacks , with the ULFA warning Hindi-speakers to leave Assam and spurring a mass exodus of workers. The Indian army believes the attacks against the laborers were carried out by an elite unit of 30 fighters from the ULFA?s 28th battalion. These attacks have been bracketed by a series of bombings and shootings in public areas , including markets and transportation hubs, and against Indian security forces and government officials. The ULFA has vowed to turn its sights on leaders of the state?s ruling Congress party if the government in Delhi does not cease military operations against the group. The group made good on this threat last week, assassinating Chandra Chutia , the leader of a village unit of the Congress party in Assam?s Dibrugarh district.
In response to the uptick in insurgent violence, Delhi has deployed roughly 20,000 Indian troops to smother ULFA operations. In addition, Delhi has extended an offer to the ULFA to renew peace talks, which they flatly rejected.
With Neighbors Like These?
The operational strength and vigor of the ULFA and other separatist groups is buttressed by the availability of safe havens for planning, training, and regrouping in Bangladesh (Country Profile and WAR Report) and Burma.
? J.P. Sinha, the top official of India?s Border Security Force in Assam, said that ?major? ULFA leaders have been given a ?place of safety? in Bangladesh, though Dhaka has denied this allegation.
? Indian intelligence believes that at least half a dozen separatist insurgent groups, including the ULFA, operate from bases across India?s unfenced border in Burma?s northern Sagaing region. India has established camps in the Arunachal Pradesh province to intercept ULFA guerrillas.
Forecast: ULFA Harried, but Punching Out of the Corner
ULFA rebels will likely continue a high tempo and ranging campaign of insurgent attacks in Assam in the near-term. The group?s rejection of peace talks signals their perception that militancy is a more advantageous course for pursuing its strategic goals. Further, stepped up ULFA attacks may serve a near-term tactical goal of creating operational space and undermining and delaying Indian counterinsurgency operations by forcing India to commit some of its forces to defensive operations.
Further, the longer-term landscape of potential counterinsurgency developments in India, Burma, and Bangladesh that may begin to gain traction and harry ULFA operational and organizational strength may compel the group to invigorate operations, land blows against the Indians, and make ?on-the-ground? strategic gains while it still can. The ULFA may try to position itself more advantageously should organizational and operational degradation by Indian, and possibly Burmese and Bangladeshi, military operations force the group to the negotiating table. With the intensified Indian military presence and counterinsurgency operations in Assam; with the current interim government and military in Bangladesh possibly turning against ULFA camps as part of their security drive, and with the Awami League political bloc?hostile to ULFA presence in Bangladesh?possibly gaining power in national elections likely sometime this year, the ULFA may see their window of operational strength and relative freedom closing.
Indian army commander for Assam, Major General N.C. Marwah said, ?We feel that if they are militarily degraded and feel hurt then they will come in on their knees.? While a sound counterinsurgency strategy, this course of action will also likely provoke spasms of defensive violence by insurgents as they are cornered and degraded.
As the ULFA is likely to continue to step up attacks in the near-term, its ideological-strategic mindset and modus operandi will likely lead the group to focus operations on particular targets. The ULFA?s grievances of perceived Indian exploitation, subjugation, and neglect of the Assamese have cultivated the group?s mindset for violence aimed at liberating Assam of Indian government and outside ethnic communal control. Therefore, the ULFA will likely seek to target both symbolic and functional instruments and agents of Indian power, presence, and control or other instruments of power perceived as harvesting the region?s natural resources. Further, the ULFA?s apparent mindset is also aimed at liberating Assam of non-Assamese ethno-nationalist communities and will lead the group to target those ?outsider?, particularly Hindi, communities. The ULFA?s modus operandi suggests a preference for guerrilla assaults and terrorist bombings against more vulnerable, population-dense public targets. In this vein, Hindi-speaking laborers are a vulnerable target?representing both Indian exploitation of the region and ethno-nationalist ?outsiders?–and hearken to similar ULFA attacks on Hindi-speakers in 2000 that killed 100 (Terrorist Incident forthcoming).
