After the release of al-Qaeda?s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri?s, audiotape addressed to Muslims in Somalia on January 5, 2007 , the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian forces have faced two consecutive days of insurgent, guerrilla-style attacks from unidentified Somali gunmen . The gunmen are likely to be former members of the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC; Group Profile), who are loyally acting on the wishes of al-Qaeda. Former SICC leaders are ?missing in action? since the TFG and Ethiopian forces seized Mogadishu two weeks ago . Since then, former SICC militants have been looking to fill the void with a much more powerful leadership?one that will direct them in an all-too-familiar insurgency modus operandi against the TFG and Ethiopian forces.
However, the current absence of an active militia leader in Somalia can mean hope for the TFG. There exists an opportunity?albeit, a brief window–in Somalia for the TFG to gain more popular support if they (1) win the support of warlords and their supporters; (2) get the Ethiopians out of Somalia; and (3) successfully distribute humanitarian aid and relief to the people. This is sure to be a long campaign; it will be even longer and bloodier as long the Ethiopians are present.
Nationalists and Islamists Join Forces
The Ethiopian presence may radicalize a greater proportion of Somali Muslims. Those who were less inclined to carry out al-Qaeda-style insurgency attacks, or even identify themselves with radical Islam, are more willing to jump on the bandwagon for the sake of nationalism. Somalis are more willing to identify themselves with hard-line religious ideology as long as it alongside their fellow brothers and sisters.
A TFG deadline for former SICC militants and secular warlords to turn in their weapons was ignored last week mostly because Somalis do not recognize the foreign power as anything but an invasion of their sovereignty. As long as Ethiopians remain in the country in large numbers, it is difficult to envision the TFG acquiring the legitimacy needed to persuade even its own warlords to disarm at the behest of a foreign power.
A Brief Window of Opportunity
Ethiopians and the US-established International Somali Contact Group should take advantage of the brief window presented to them to pressure the TFG to broaden its support and credibility by co-opting moderate Islamist and clan-based elements. The SICC was as much a business and politically-sponsored, clan-based entity as it was a religious and ideological one.
The TFG should check its own warlord allies and persuade them not to carve up Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia into mini-enclaves. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that in order for this to happen, the TFG and Ethiopian forces need to develop an exit plan and stick to it.
The majority of Somalis, including the SICC, regarded UN Security Council Resolution 1725 as a trigger for conflict when it was passed December 6, 2007. The proposed African Union (AU) peacekeeping force was regarded as a US proxy occupation. Now, however, the politics and logistics of peace enforcement mean that the Ethiopians must withdraw soon (within weeks according to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi), but there must be an effective armed force present to attempt to disarm secular warlords and allow humanitarian aid to reach civilians. Equally important, it must ensure that Islamists do not revive.
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni is the only member of the AU who has committed to deploying 1,000 troops to Somalia; however, Uganda will deploy troops when there is a clear exit strategy and a clear peace to keep. This presents a dilemma to the Ethiopians since they need the AU force present in order to leave. Ideally, the UN should step in with its own peacekeeping force, but they already have close to 30,000 troops deployed on 15 other missions around the world.
Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf said on January 8 that there would be no negotiations with Islamists before departing to the capital for his first official visit since his government ousted the SICC. If Yusuf does not try to engage with moderate Islamists and clan-based warlords to incorporate these elements into the new government, the TFG will face a long bloody road ahead with little help from the outside. The TFG should seize this unique opportunity for peace in wartorn Somalia. Patience is running thin, and as a result, moderate Islamists will be more inclined to tote the al-Qaeda line if it means getting back at those who blew the opportunity for peace.
