Overview:
The primary drivers impacting security and stability in the Middle East region in 2007 are Iran?s regional and nuclear aspirations, increasing sectarian violence in Iraq , and civil strife fueled by politically-empowered terrorist groups Hamas and Hizballah in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon respectively.
Both terrorists emerging from the Iraqi theater as well as indigenous militants present a threat to every nation in the region. Terrorists with experience in Iraq are likely to be the most experienced bomb makers in the region outside of the Palestinian Territories.
In addition to terrorist plots executed by established organizations, 2007 will likely see a trend of smaller attacks and assassinations carried out by individuals or small groups animated by Jihadist ideology against targets of opportunity.
Peaceful nations with considerable western populations stand to be most impacted by terrorist events. Dubai is currently growing at breakneck speed, and its expansion may strain the abilities of its security forces to keep tabs on its transient population. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan will be the targets of terrorist plots because of the perception that they are used as ?rear bases? in the US occupation of Iraq.
Primary Conflict Drivers
Iranian ambitions
In 2007 Iran will continue to exploit and fuel conflicts in the Palestinian territories and Iraq while pressing forward with its nuclear weapons? program. Iran will avoid overtly aggressive measures it has previously employed, such as mining shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf, but will maintain its support of Palestinian terrorist organizations, Iraqi Shiite militias, and Hizballah.
Iran?s efforts in Iraq to fund Shiite empowerment will continue to strongly contribute to sectarian violence in that country. Through these militias Iran will continue to promote its primary goal for Iraq: the creation of a friendly but weakened neighbor state, where Shiites are empowered, Sunnis are disenfranchised, and the autonomy of the Kurds is restrained.
Lastly, Iran will ignore the UN Security Council (UNSC) demand that it cease uranium enrichment as it strives for a weapons? capable nuclear program . Tehran is confident that P-5 members, China and Russia , will not agree to debilitating, stringent UNSC sanctions ; and that any military strike on nuclear installations would not cripple the nuclear program beyond repair.
Internecine conflict in Iraq
High levels of sectarian violence in Iraq between Sunni and Shiite populations will persist in 2007. A strong trend towards escalation was seen in the latter half of 2006, when estimates show that more than 17,000 Iraqi civilians and police were killed, a more than three-fold increase over the first six months of 2006.
In 2007, Al-Qaeda and the associated Islamist movement in Iraq will continue to survive in this sustaining milieu of sectarian violence. However, warring Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish militias will surpass these Islamist groups in their threat to Iraqi security. Al-Qaeda and allied organizations in Iraq could be virtually subsumed or marginalized by indigenous Sunni militias in 2007.
Hamas and Hizballah
The political empowerment of terrorist groups was a major feature of 2006. However, the groups? ensuing behavior and the reaction of local, regional, and international actors proved destabilizing. In the case of Hamas and Hizballah, the turmoil experienced in the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon respectively will continue in the coming year.
Following the ascendancy of Hamas to political power in the Palestinian Territories, the opening of 2007 finds the Palestinians on the cusp of civil war. The heart of the problem is weak leadership and political stalemate between Hamas and the other key Palestinian party, Fatah which has erupted into street violence and escalating reciprocal attacks. In an ominous development, the US and Israeli government are preparing to significantly increase financial and logistical aid to Fatah forces loyal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The decision appears to be a preparatory step in the arming of one side for an eventual civil war.
Hizballah?s unilateral war against Israel in the summer of 2006 revealed the danger Hizballah and its weapons represent to the very society it was allegedly created to protect. While some hoped that Hizballah?s brazen decision to drag Lebanon into war with Israel would result in its disarmament, this is no longer a feasible goal in 2007. Merely preventing rearmament of material and equipment lost during the summer war will likely remain beyond the powers of the embattled Lebanese government.
While there has been some talk of another Israel-Hizballah war in 2007, this is unlikely given the recent war?s respective impact on both parties. Currently, Hizballah is tackling the US-backed Lebanese government, by orchestrating key government resignations, intimidating its opposition, and organizing overwhelming sit-ins and protests in the streets of Beirut. Hizballah?s attempt to parlay its self-declared ?victory? over Israel this summer into increased political control is threatening the current government?s ability to reconstruct Lebanon in the wake of Hizballah?s unilateral war.
In order for the Lebanese government to escape its current deadlock, it will be forced to cede to Hizballah?s intimidation. At that point, Hizballah will be as politically empowered as it ever has been, presenting a considerable threat to Lebanese democracy, autonomy, and domestic stability.
Islamist Terrorism in 2007
While every state in the region is vulnerable to terrorism, TRC expects western interests to be most impacted by the terrorist threat in Jordan and the Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia , Kuwait , Bahrain , the United Arab Emirates , Yemen , Jordan , Qatar , Oman ).
Summary
The conflict in Iraq, tensions with Iran, and Hizballah and Hamas? destabilizing influences on Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories will continue to plague the region through 2007.
Terrorism will continue to present a worrisome challenge to domestic governments and western interests throughout the region. While a number of local governments exhibit consistent success in arresting terrorists and thwarting their plots, some militants will elude counterterrorist efforts with disastrous consequences. Two relatively new breeds of militancy add a new dimension to the problem: self-activating individuals or small groups who lack links to established organizations and experienced veterans of the Iraqi insurgency.
