The growth of sectarian militias that are engaged in persistent, sectarian warfare threatens to destabilize Iraq , as these militias are a direct challenge to the central government?s monopoly on violence. US officials are pressuring the Maliki government to take more aggressive measures against Muqtada Sadr?s Mahdi Army , arguably the most powerful militia in Iraq. However, Maliki advocates an approach that centers on patient, political co-option of militias and their leaders. While it may seem counter-intuitive, Maliki?s subtle course remains the most viable option of addressing the militia security dilemma and ultimately strengthening the authority of the central government.
Let Them Do Their Own Dirty Work
The Mahdi Army is not a single actor. Since the militia?s inception, it has operated under a loose command and control structure whereby many military commanders purport an affiliation to the Mahdi Army, generally operating under the strategic guidance of Sadr?but ultimately acting autonomously. Increasingly, Sadr and his deputies are attempting to gain greater control over the attacks committed in their name, as the growth of more extreme splinter cells has led to climbing levels of violence in the Baghdad area. In a direct threat to those offenders, a chief Sadr advisor warned, ?If you would ever fail to comply with [his orders], then I frankly tell you that you will regret it, and you?d rather die? (source).
The imperative for this in-house cleaning of the Mahdi Army is related to Sadr?s political investment in the Iraqi government. If Sadr commits to the project of a centralized Iraqi authority, the refusal of segments of his movement to abide in that direction will become a political embarrassment and will likely be addressed internally. Already, some high level members have abandoned the movement in protest of Sadr becoming too accommodating of the Iraqi government. Thus, providing an avenue for Sadr?s clear political ambitions within the official state framework could result in a moderation of the Mahdi Army?s activities.
Futility of the Military Option
A concerted military-police crackdown against the Mahdi Army will likely lead the militia to take up arms against the government and potentially withdraw its significant representation in the government. Moreover, military pressure on the leadership of the Sadr movement could accelerate the operations of the local cells that are currently responsible for the increase in violent, sectarian attacks. Reducing the capabilities of the Mahdi Army is also unlikely to reduce the overall problem of militia violence. In Iraq?s zero sum environment, the effect of such a policy will not serve to dissuade other militias from attacks, but to will increase their relative power.
Back Maliki
Maliki?s political co-option strategy for dealing with militias is borne from his government?s significant loss of public support, as it fails to provide social services or security. In turn, Maliki has personally become more dependent on the political support of Sadr to keep his ruling coalition intact and in power.
The problem of militias is not the entities themselves, but the vacuum of legitimate governance in post-Saddam Iraq that has allowed them to flourish. US policy should continue its strong support of Maliki?s government, making efforts to improve the Iraqi government?s ability to deliver for the people. Such a development will improve Maliki?s leverage vis-?-vis his dealings with the militias.
