Before pledging formal allegiance to al-Qaeda , the GSPC enjoyed regional support from neighboring rebel groups. During 32 European kidnappings between February-March 2003, the Algerian -based Islamic militant group sought refuge in the deserts of northern Mali . They paid off neighboring rebel groups like the former Tuareg group, Democratic Alliance for Change (DAC; Group Profile forthcoming) for their shelter and support and even recruited some of them. However, that all changed when the DAC signed a peace deal with the Mali government in July 2006, vowing to disarm and join in the fight against the GSPC in exchange for development aid in the remote desert areas where they live. Major clashes between the two groups occurred after the GSPC formally joined al-Qaeda in September . Seen as revenge for the killing of an Algerian militant leader in September, the GSPC killed nine DAC former rebels on October 23, 2006 (source).
The GSPC?s regional lifeline is cutting out fast, leaving the group even more dependent on big brother al-Qaeda not just for funding and logistical support, but also for strength and power. Although no group has formally claimed responsibility for the October 30 simultaneous truck bomb explosions in front of two police stations in Algeria , state officials believe the GSPC was behind the attack (source). Shedding light on the extent of al-Qaeda?s support for the GSPC, their alleged attack provides an excellent example of the dual team?s destructive capabilities.
GSPC Making Up for Shortcomings
The GSPC leader?s death by Mali rebels may be enough motivation to call on big brother al-Qaeda for back up. In a fear provoking, muscle-flexing demonstration, the GSPC allegedly detonated truck bombs in front of two police stations in order to serve two likely purposes: 1.) to prove to former rebel groups, like the DAC, that the GSPC does not need their support, and 2.) to showcase how spectacular al-Qaeda?s support can be. At the very least, the blasts will show other terrorist groups, either on the fence about joining al-Qaeda or in need of a push in ?right? direction, just what al-Qaeda?s support and assistance can do. According to analysts on the scene, the attack was ?the most elaborate in years? in the Islamist group?s attempt to create a pure Islamic state (source). The GSPC most likely wants to prove that even with the loss of one of their major militant leaders, they are still just as strong, if not stronger now, with the support of al-Qaeda.
However, the bad news for the GSPC is that the DAC will most likely also attempt to prove their own newly found alliance with national government forces, as well as with US and Algerian government forces. As long as the Mali government continues to send development aid to the remote desert areas where the nomadic Tuareg population lives, the former DAC will continue do their part to capture and dismantle the GSPC. The international community should expect to see more violent attacks from the GSPC in and around northern Africa as they continue to prove their robust capabilities as the new arm of al-Qaeda.
