On September 11, 2006, Bin Laden biographer and interviewer Hamid Mir went on Arabic satellite television and announced that Bin Laden had another big attack in store for the United States . He claimed that the operational leader, the ?Mohammed Atta? of this attack, was already at large within the country ? a man named Adnan Shukrijumah. Mir also claimed that Shukrijumah might have smuggled ?nuclear material? into the US for use in the alleged operation (see below article in this War Report)
While Mir?s claims have not been substantiated by other sources, the announcement has brought renewed attention to al-Qaeda?s nuclear ambitions. Evidence gathered from Jihadist websites, al-Qaeda camps and safe houses in Afghanistan , and other sources of intelligence suggest that, in spite of Mir?s warning, al-Qaeda does not and nor has ever possessed a nuclear weapon. Existing documents suggest a high degree of interest, but little actual capability – at least at the time of the Afghan invasion in 2001. This does not mean that a nuclear terrorist attack is still impossible or even improbable over the long term. As al-Qaeda strategist Abu Ubaid al-Qureishi once commented in a published rumination on the possibility of al-Qaeda obtaining a nuclear weapon: ?The mission of the Jihad movements in this arena is difficult but not impossible. Logically speaking, this should be a matter of supply and demand.?
?A Matter of Supply and Demand?
Al-Qureishi?s comments suggested that al-Qaeda should be able to buy a nuclear weapon on the black market, specifically from former Soviet Union countries. He cites a paper from the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies which assessed the security at ten different Russian nuclear sites and found, according to al-Qureishi, that ?a number of buildings devoted to storing great quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) ? enough of it to manufacture nearly 70,000 nuclear bombs ? had no armed guards, no security perimeters, no surveillance cameras, and no radiation detectors at their entrances and exits.?
Al-Qureishi wrote this paper sometime before his death in 2002. Al-Qaeda?s progress, if any, on obtaining plutonium or enriched uranium through ?supply and demand? has not been commented on in any subsequent publications from the group. However, data suggests that al-Qaeda may have made connections with Pakistani scientists who were able to provide the group with nuclear weapons? blueprints of unknown sophistication. If technologically skilled and resource-rich elements of the al-Qaeda organization were able to obtain HEU or plutonium in the future, they may be able to successfully assemble a device.
As for infiltrating a device into the United States, al-Qureishi highlights the southern border with Mexico as a potential entrance point: ?Two hundred and fifty four million people, 75 million cars, and 3.5 million trucks entered America from Mexico, [according to data] from 1996. At the 38 official points of entry, only five percent of this huge amount is inspected. These are numbers which call for contemplation.?
Nuclear Manuals
Crude nuclear weapons? schematics and manuals garnered much press attention following their discovery in former training camps and houses of al-Qaeda members in Afghanistan. In particular, the ?Superbomb? document collected from the house of Abu Khabab, who headed al-Qaeda?s non-conventional weapons? research program, discovered in 2002 first brought al-Qaeda?s interest in WMD to the awareness of the American public.
Examinations of al-Qaeda nuclear weapons? documents and materials examined by technical experts reveal a range of sophistication, from information that is ?remarkably inaccurate or na?ve? to more sophisticated data on particular aspects of nuclear technology, like the nuclear fuel cycle (source). According to David Albright, who studied a number of documents discovered in Afghanistan, a considerably small percentage of weapons? manuals and other recovered materials focused on nuclear weapons in particular or even WMD generally. In his assessment, none of the materials implied that al-Qaeda had been successful in acquiring nuclear weapons, nor nuclear materials. Neither did environmental tests conducted at suspect sites turn up any trace of HEU or plutonium.
Albright concedes, however, that evidence at these sites suggests that al-Qaeda burned, destroyed, or secreted away documents on nuclear weapons that may have been the most incriminating or significant. An accurate assessment of the group?s progress in procuring either a nuclear weapon or its components may thus be obstructed by the destruction and loss of certain key documents.
Nuclear Resources on Jihadist Websites
At least two ?manuals? claiming to pertain to the manufacture of nuclear weapons have been circulated on Jihadist websites . In addition, at least two websites have been created devoted to gathering information, both general and technical, on the manufacture of these weapons. Both manuals contain either incorrect or banally general information. One of the websites, however, has made progress in attaining a degree of technical sophistication that, while insufficient for constructing a nuclear device, indicates a level of tech savvy that could be put to use in building other, less complicated non-conventional weapons, such as radiological devices.
Milestone on the Road to a Nuclear Weapon: A Dirty Bomb
In the course of exploring ways to build a nuclear device, both the al-Qaeda core in Afghanistan and those behind the cache of resources on Jihadist websites have amassed a useful store of information on how to build dirty bombs, or radiological dispersal devices. Also, there are numerous examples of individuals at various levels of the al-Qaeda organization and the international Jihadist movement confusing the two in their discussions, frequently referring to dirty bombs incorrectly as ?nuclear bombs.? Because of this tendency to confuse the two, reports like that passed on by Hamid Mir that al-Qaeda may have ?nuclear bombs? or ?nuclear materials,? may actually refer to dirty bombs and radiological materials. These devices are considerably easier to make, but also much less potentially deadly than nuclear weapons.
Conclusion: Aspirations Outstrip Capability (For Now); al-Qaeda May Settle for a Dirty Bomb
The confusion between dirty bombs and nuclear bombs may help al-Qaeda from a propaganda perspective; if the organization successfully detonates a dirty bomb, it may be try to claim to its international community of supporters in the Islamic world that it set off a ?nuclear? device. This message may resonate successfully in certain Islamic communities where the public is not educated in the differences between the two types of weapons. After all, the public in countries with only peripheral involvement in the Cold War did not get the almost daily influx of information and reportage on nuclear weapons and technology that American citizens received, and thus may be only vaguely familiar with the concept of these weapons. Moreover, the technology, skills, and materials needed to build a dirty bomb are potentially within al-Qaeda?s grasp, whereas nuclear technology appears to continue to elude them.
