An international audience looking to point to a decisive winner in the Hizballah -Israeli conflict will be disappointed. Not even the combatants themselves can decide who was victorious. At the conclusion of this conflict, as one commentator noted, ?Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared a military success, and then appointed a commission to determine what had gone wrong. Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hizballah, proclaimed a glorious victory and then explained that he would never have ordered the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers if he had thought there was ?even a one-percent chance? it would lead to war?? (source). As IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz tersely summarized when asked the ubiquitous ?who won?? question: ?Victory is a matter of opinion.?
While the victor may not be clear, it is still possible to identify certain gains and losses to each side; changes in the status quo will irrevocably impact how both sides deal with one another in the future. It may be too early to predict exactly how the following gains and losses will translate into future scenarios for Lebanese security, but at least one assessment can be made: Israel and Hizballah will avoid direct conflict over the near-term, while Israel deals with domestic political fallout and assesses ?what went wrong?? and Hizballah is kept occupied by the task of juggling new neighbors in its southern strongholds?UNIFIL and the Lebanese military–while attempting to rearm.
Hizballah?s Wins, Israel?s Losses:
No Disarmament in Sight
Disarmament, which seemed within the realm of the possible in the beginning of this conflict, is now effectively off the table for the foreseeable future. The Lebanese government and military will not confront Hizballah directly. Powerhouse factional leaders Michel Aoun and Emile Lahoud continue to support Hizballah?s possession of weapons, and Hizballah opponents Samir Geagea and Saad Hariri do not have the political muscle to commit the Lebanese government?and public–to disarmament.
UNIFIL forces will act as nothing more than Nasrallah?s esteemed guests in southern Lebanon . They may confiscate a symbolic rocket or two if Hizballah violates an agreement to keep their weapons concealed, but for the most part, they will be limited to a humanitarian and constabulary role.
Rearmament to Proceed without a Hitch
With UNIFIL and the Lebanese military erring toward timidity, Hizballah will have opportunities to rearm. Nonetheless, Nasrallah will probably first focus on bolstering weapons caches in the Bekaa Valley rather than in southern Lebanon in front of Lebanese and international forces, in order to further reduce the already minute risk of actual confrontation.
Government and Popular Support
Hizballah has maintained an important ally in spite of its unilateral war with Israel: Michel Aoun, a significant Christian factional leader. With enough added Christian and Sunni backing, Nasrallah thinks that he can ride a wave of popular support to expanded political power. As a recent al-Hayat editorial noted, ?Hizballah?s [post-conflict] celebrations do not conceal a desire to end the contradiction between a parliamentary minority and what is being portrayed as a popular majority.? However, it is more likely that any increased support for Hizballah will come in the form of allowing the group to keep its arms and maintain its defensive posture against Israel, rather than allowing it any real political power.
A Gun-Shy Israel?
If Hizballah believes its own rhetoric, then it may have deterred Israel from applying force in the near future, even in response to provocation. Hizballah may not be completely wrong about this. While Israel has maintained the right to go back into Lebanon to protect its own security, rumbles of internal dissent and the mediocre gains of the last military campaign may give Israel cause for hesitation in confronting Hizballah in the future. However, this is likely to only apply in the near-term, at least until it has become clear UNIFIL and the Lebanese military are ineffective. The Israeli strategic culture is characterized by unparalleled tenacity in confronting those enemies who pose real threats to the state. Hizballah?s guerrilla tactics have been impressive, but they have by no means stretched the Israeli military to its capacity. Israel?s decisions to redeploy have been made based on specific political and strategic decisions, not because Hizballah exhausted Israel?s military capability. Certain members of the Lebanese military seem to understand this, but Hizballah does not.
Israel?s Wins, Hizballah?s Losses
Increased Lebanese Government Sovereignty
Negotiations this summer resulted in the deployment of the Lebanese military to the south of Lebanon for the first time in 37 years. How the military behaves once they get there and whether they stay will determine if Lebanon finally reclaims the portion of its territory, which has been relegated to a Hizballah fiefdom. The international community will pressure Israel to at least give the Lebanese government a chance before applying force again, staving off another conflict.
A Degraded Arsenal for Hizballah
Nasrallah?s bluster at a recent post-conflict rally that Hizballah still possesses more than 20,000 rockets is not credible. Hizballah sacrificed a significant portion of its arsenal to fight this war. While rearmament is thought to be ongoing, it will take at least a few years for the group to regain its pre-war arsenal. Israel can be expected to scrutinize and survey the rearmament process extensively (if it does not interrupt it with force), making weapons potentially more vulnerable in the event of a future conflict.
Mutual Deterrence
While Hizballah may believe that Israel will be reluctant to attack them again, they are also likely to be as cowed by Israel?s show of force than the other way around. The organization is now shouldering the burdensome responsibility for rebuilding Shia communities from which it draws support while attempting to rearm. It is stretched too thin to risk a repeat of this summer in the near future.
Intensified Domestic Opposition
Nasrallah kept allies and may have increased the ranks of supporters with its campaign this summer, but he also swelled the anti-Hizballah camp with groups of previously ambivalent Christians and Sunnis. Geagea, Hariri, and the March 14 coalition may not be able to disarm Hizballah, but if they stay together, they may be able to erode gradually but steadily Hizballah?s political representation and power within the Lebanese government.
Nasrallah?s claims of a ?divine victory? thinly veil his insecurity over Hizballah?s ability to defeat Israel decisively as well as his unfulfilled aspirations to legitimate political power in Lebanon. Hizballah will focus on these two capabilities in the near-term: Lebanese political power and rebuilding military capability and forces. In order to achieve these, it will avoid going too far in its provocations of Israel and will also avoid attacking international forces, controlling them in other ways. Israel will grow increasingly frustrated at the lack of effectiveness of the UN effort, and tensions may build to an eventual encore. The Lebanese government is the only party in a position to tame Hizballah, but it cannot do so in its current state of weakness and fragmentation.