US intelligence and law enforcement officials acknowledged in the recently declassified key judgments of the April 2006 of the National Intelligence Estimate ?Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States? that terrorist groups ?of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial support (source).?
Certainly, the increased use of the Internet by terrorist groups is a disturbing trend and must be vigorously countered. However, it must also be considered that the use of the Internet by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda represents a weakness.
Al-Qaeda?s Weakness
In the case of al-Qaeda, its preferred method of communication seems to be in-person meetings. As such, the increased use of the Internet may represent a weakness in the core organization, while at the same time have an uneven effect on its broader ideological movement.
While the Internet, when used properly, may provide a terrorist group some degree of communication and security, it is not always as secure and efficient as face-to-face meetings. For example, prior to 9/11 , al-Qaeda maintained a physical base of operations in Afghanistan that allowed it to communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, coordinate logistical and financial support, and plan attacks in person. This level of coordination allowed the terrorist group to plan and organize the attacks of 9/11.
Since al-Qaeda?s ouster from Afghanistan, the group has been unable to replicate its success on 9/11 with another attack on the US homeland or another attack of equal devastation outside the US. One of the reasons for al-Qaeda?s inability to carry out another spectacular attack on the US homeland has been its inability to communicate and coordinate on-line with the same degree of efficiency and security as it did prior to 9/11 when it enjoyed a physical sanctuary in Afghanistan.
Recently declassified internal communications between al-Qaeda leaders in hiding in Pakistan and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq shed light on the core organizations view of its relative strength. According to the al-Qaeda leader known as ?Atiyah, al-Qaeda is currently in a weakened state. In his letter to al-Zarqawi, ?Atiyah states, ?know that we, like all the mujahidin, are still weak. We are in the stage of weakness and a state of paucity. We have not yet reached a level of stability? (source).
Disrupted Lines of Communication
?Atiyah goes on to state that al-Qaeda?s worldwide lines of communications are in disarray and specifically states that it is hard to communicate with Zarqawi from outside of Iraq. ?Aityah recommends that Zarqawi utilize the Internet to communicate with al-Qaeda?s core leadership. He states, ?I am ready to communicate via the Internet or any other means, so send me your men to ask for me on the chat forum of Ana al-Muslim, or others? (source).
Any future communication between Zarqawi and al-Qaeda?s core leadership was dependent on this written plea for Zarqawi to search the Internet for the right web site or chat room. Therefore, communicating on-line is not as simple as getting a connection to the Internet, and it is also subject to security concerns such as possible interception by hostile intelligence services. It is safe to assume that al-Qaeda had an easier time communicating when it maintained a physical base of operations in Afghanistan that allowed it to conduct in-person meetings with other terrorist leaders.
The Double Edged Sword
While communication via the Internet for a hierarchical terrorist organization like al-Qaeda?s core appears less than ideal, many pundits have argued that the Internet is the ideal mode of communication for al-Qaeda?s broader ideological movement. However, recently disrupted terrorist plots (Terror Web Watch and Intel Report) demonstrate that intelligence and law enforcement agencies have had success in monitoring the Internet for intelligence on pending terrorist attacks.
Therefore, the Internet enables the continued spread of al-Qaeda?s ideology; however, the Internet presents law enforcement and intelligence organizations with a valuable counter-terrorism opportunity to obstruct the formation of al-Qaeda-inspired cells and disrupt planned terrorist attacks.
