In the videotape released on September 11, 2006, al-Qaeda?s number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, relayed Osama bin Laden?s ?announcement to Muslims? that ?the GSPC [Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat] [Group Profile] has joined al-Qaeda.? Al-Zawahiri contextualized this declaration by calling on the Algerian Islamic militant group to be ?a bone in the throats of the American and French crusaders and their allies, and inspire distress, concern and dejection in the hearts of the traitorous, apostate sons of France? (source). Although the historically locally-oriented GSPC pledged their allegiance to Osama Bin Laden three years ago, an official statement signed by the group?s Amir, Abu Mus?ab Abd al-Wadoud, was posted on the group?s website on September 13, just two days after al-Zawahiri?s declaration (source). This is the first time al-Qaeda openly recognized their merger into the international Islamic Jihad against the ?infidels.? More importantly, al-Qaeda?s ?blessed union? with the GSPC introduces a dangerous dynamic into the global war on terror because of the GSPC?s networks across Europe and North Africa which can be leveraged in al-Qaeda operations.
The Utility of France
Why would al-Qaeda seek to forge an alliance with a group that has typically not shown much interest in operations outside Algeria ? One reason could be that al-Qaeda, having lost much of its logistical networks in other areas?namely, Afghanistan , Pakistan , and the Middle East?might be looking to make up some of their losses by relying on the GSPC?s connections in Europe. There are numerous GSPC operatives in the French speaking world. By 2003, ?dozens? of GSPC militants made their way to Europe, ?especially Spain [Country Profile], France [Country Profile] and Belgium [Country Profile] where they have been waiting for a fresh call to jihad? (source).
Another reason could be a change in the GSPC?s ideology. Since its split from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1998 until September 2003, the GSPC had been focused on the Islamic Jihad inside Algeria, typically targeting Algerian soldiers and police. However, since the group?s former leader, Nabil Sahraoui, pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, the GSPC has gradually broadened its perspective on Islamic Jihad. In March 2005, the GSPC posted on their website a declaration of war against all foreigners in Algeria (see related Intel Report). Further, in August of the same year, the GSPC called on Algerian Muslims in France to attack the Algerian elite residing or vacationing in France, underscoring their existing networks in France (see related Intel Report). The group is no longer fighting on a strictly national frontline. Rather, the GSPC is increasingly subscribing to al-Qaeda?s international fight against the ?infidels.? This is a significant strategic shift because the GSPC must change its priorities in accordance with the changing strategy of ?big brother? al-Qaeda.
Strategic Planning on Both Sides
Since 2002, the GSPC has experienced major setbacks, primarily due to internal strife, the loss of two Amirs, and the steadily improving skills of the Algerian police and security forces. Sources approximate that of the 800 militants the group was estimated to have last year ?no more than 500 remain? (source). Joining al-Qaeda, however, will likely have a positive impact on the GSPC?s resources. Some of these benefits include: increasing funds for terrorist plots, more advanced weaponry, a wider range of intelligence information, and easier access to logistical resources. In addition, the GSPC will likely benefit from the merger in its efforts at home as well. It is important to note that the GSPC has never claimed to abandon its long struggle for a ?pure? Islamic Algerian state. Quite the contrary, in exchange for al-Qaeda?s easy access to the GSPC?s networks in Europe, al-Qaeda will likely help the GSPC achieve its goals at home. The GSPC?s broader perspective on Islamic Jihad does not necessarily mean an abandonment of their efforts at home.
On the other hand, al-Qaeda also has much, if not more, to gain from this merger. At the very least, the alliance between the two groups will function as an efficient exchange program?the GSPC will provide open access to their European networks in exchange for al-Qaeda?s financial and logistical support. In addition, most GSPC?s members are fluent in French and experts in forging French documents, such as visas and other legal documentation. Having open access to resourceful Algerian Muslims in France will likely benefit al-Qaeda?s quest to bring down ?the apostate sons of France? and other Western targets.
Impact on the International War on Terror
Al-Qaeda?s merger with the GSPC is significant because of its long lasting implications to the war on terror. The fear is that al-Qaeda?s formal recognition of the GSPC?s partnership could elevate the group to the same status enjoyed by other al-Qaeda affiliate groups. Therefore, a closer relationship with al-Qaeda will likely propel the GSPC into the forefront of international Islamic terrorism. The alliance between the two groups will likely result in more sophisticated terrorist plotting and, consequently, more lethal operations. Moreover, the joining of forces will enhance the reach of the alliance, utilizing GSPC networks throughout North Africa and Western Europe. In an example of this reach, on July 21, 2006, five GSPC members were arrested in Italy for their involvement in a variety of terrorist planning operations, support activities, and logistical assistance within Italy and overseas (source). There are other cases in which several Algerian nationals have been arrested in Europe for their affiliation with the GSPC. Thus, the Al Qaeda-GSPC alliance presents an increasingly formidable and ranging threat within al Qaeda?s global jihadist networks, and one particularly threatening to Europe.