The recently concluded conflict in Lebanon has dealt Israel a significant psychological blow. The country’s identity is intimately intertwined with its military, and the fabled Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was unable to overwhelm and defeat the Hezbollah guerrilla army. Moving forward, Israeli foreign policy will be shaped by two, subsequent perceptional developments:
? on the domestic front, a shaken public confidence in the ability of government and military leaders to wage successful campaigns;
? among regional enemies, a belief that Israel is vulnerable to asymmetric warfare.
The likely impact on Israeli policy is a more hard-line posture toward traditional adversaries such as Syria and the Palestinians?a safe reaction and comfortable return to a well-known position. However, the results of the conflict have also set the stage for a risky and, therefore, less likely direction: namely, an Israeli policy that refrains from using the military as its primary problem solving option, but rather as a complementary tool to earnest, diplomatic negotiations.
Post-Conflict Internal Analysis
The Israeli-Hezbollah ceasefire brought forth within Israel an array of internal criticism and reflection over the plan, execution, and outcome of the conflict. On the floor of the Knesset, Benjamin Netyanyahu , leader of the conservative Likud Party, stated, “There were many failures. Failures in identifying the threat, failures in preparing to meet the threat, failures in the management of the war, failures in the management of the home front” (source). Indeed, questions abound on the military’s reliance on an air campaign, the halting nature of the eventual ground campaign, an underestimation of Hezbollah’s advanced weaponry, and a lack of supplies and training for reservists. Recent polls reflect an Israeli citizenry frustrated by a war that cost hundreds of lives, billions of dollars, and achieved very little: two Israeli soldiers remain captive, and Hezbollah is still armed and in control of southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah has cleverly crafted its survival as a victory over Israel, and much of the Arab world appears to agree. The fear for Israel is that Hezbollah’s asymmetric fighting style?guerrilla tactics, low-grade rocket saturation–will be viewed as a model for success and encourage other parties to test Israel militarily. In embracing Hezbollah’s victory, President Bashar Assad (see photo: Ricardo Stuckert_ABr) has spoken brazenly of liberating the Golan Heights. To this end, Syria has reportedly created a guerrilla force, Front for the Liberation of the Golan (Group Profile forthcoming), in the model of Hezbollah and to be trained by Hezbollah operatives (source).
Altered Symmetry of Power
This conflict may have changed the asymmetry of power, which has historically governed Israel’s external relations in the immediate region, and thereby potentially facilitate future negotiations. From the perspective of the Israeli-Palestinian power framework previously developed by former Senior Advisor with the US State Department Aaron David Miller (source), the disheartening results against Hezbollah may cause Israel to rethink its tendency to rely on military strength to create favorable positions on the ground. Conversely, Israel’s newly confident adversaries may now be disinclined to play the traditional role of victim, bereft of responsibility for perpetrating terrorism and violence because they are either occupied or have had their land taken. In short, a more even battlefield where either side can inflict damage could provide enough mutual leverage to create balanced and productive diplomatic negotiations.