As noted in these pages over the past weeks, Iraq is in the throws of at least a low-level, if not outright, sectarian civil war. As the machinery of civil war accelerates, key sectarian groups from the Shia and Sunni camps seem poised to drift to greater extremes in political posture and violence, possibly allying themselves with more violent actors. Together, these dynamics point to an increased potential for the polarizing and galvanizing of militant sectarian groups to greater violence and politically extreme postures, outright civil war, and the fragmentation of Iraq into sectarian-defined enclaves and provinces.
Recent reports indicate that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is strengthening in western Iraq. AQI has adopted a more refined and sophisticated insurgent strategy than the brutal terrorism urged under the leadership of Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi that balances terrorist and guerrilla violence with insurgent political and civic initiatives. The approach seeks to exploit societal and political frustrations?namely high unemployment, a deteriorating security environment, and a lack of reliable electricity and fuel–and cultivate a base of support. A support base will offer operational resources in the form of societal camouflage, intelligence and materiel smuggling networks, and recruits, all likely enhancing the group’s operational fitness and strength, societal entrenchment, and organizational durability. In particular, AQI likely seeks to exploit a Sunni community threatened by Shia militias and a Shia-dominated government and further disillusioned that communal political goals and interests are perceived as biased against them. These factors are likely to push a disenchanted Sunni community into a retreat to the perceived safety of sectarian communal groupings and into a more square participation in the insurgency as a defense mechanism against the Shia government and militias. Such a shift could draw Sunni insurgents into greater operational collaboration with AQI, driven together by the common cause of battling the Shia, despite long-term strategic and political dissonance between the two camps. A potential collaboration of the Sunni community with AQI would invigorate the insurgency and likely lead to an upsurge in the pace and ferocity of insurgent, Sunni sectarian attacks.
Militant elements in the Shia camp are shifting toward more extremist and violent positions and alliances. As noted in last week’s WAR Report, Moqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia is reportedly fragmenting into extremist, violent, and uncompromising splinter groups. Other reports indicate that Iran (Country Report) is supporting through “proxies” certain Shia militias?including elements of the Mahdi Army–providing weapons, bomb technology, and training, thus enhancing the militias’ operational potency. As the international community and the US bear down on Iran for both its support of Hizballah adventurism against Israel and its nuclear ambitions, Iran is likely to incite Shia militias to ratchet up violence against US and Coalition forces as an instrument of deterrence and coercion against international pressure. Indeed, US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad said that Iran is pressing Shia militias to escalate attacks against US forces in response to Israel’s offensive against Hizballah, and it is likely to continue this tact in the run-up to a standoff between Iran and the US and United Nations over Iran’s nuclear program. Khalilzad cited a surge in mortar and rocket attacks on the Green Zone as evidence of Iranian instigation of militia violence. Khalilzad also noted that splinter groups of the Mahdi Army are responsible for the recent attacks and that they are linked to Iran and Hizballah.
As the potential increases that militant actors from both the Sunni and Shia camps will drift to more extreme and violent positions, possibly strengthened in terms of operational capability and instigated to greater violence by alliances with actors with interests in ratcheting up violence?AQI and Iran respectively?the potential for a further escalation of the sectarian conflict and insurgency will increase.