To say that the conflict between Israel and Hizballah is asymmetric is an understatement. Rather, Israel and Hizballah are fighting two different wars, with Israel focused on a military campaign and Hizballah playing a complicated and well-managed international public relations game. The Lebanese military will soon find itself in an impossible position between these two wars from which it could emerge even weaker than before.
Israel recently reached a point of diminishing returns in its military campaign and agreed to a cease-fire in order to improve its chances of further gains through political and diplomatic means. On a strictly military score card, Israel entered the cease-fire in a solid position. However, Hizballah’s military operations are subverted to the greater priority of its image inside and outside of Lebanon. By this standard of comparison, Hizballah enters this week on the strongest footing since Israel’s withdrawal in 2000.
The cease-fire is being portrayed as a Hizballah achievement, proof that the militia is capable of forcing Israel to stand down and enter negotiations. It has not had to meet Israel’s initial demand of releasing the two Israeli soldiers it holds captive . Now, the international community, including the United States , is proposing that Israel consider ending its long-time occupation of the disputed Sheba’a Farms (source). This will allow Hizballah to justify its aggression by claiming that it has used force to compel Israel to open negotiations over occupied territory.
Any chance at disarming Hizballah also seems to have slipped away after more than a month of conflict. Hizballah is using the conflict as proof that it must hold onto its arms in order to repel an Israeli invasion. Another Israeli invasion seemed unlikely prior to this conflict, after six years of relative peace, leaving Hizballah scrambling to justify its existence. With Israel ground troops receding from Lebanon, but Israel maintaining “the right to defend itself,” Hizballah can highlight the threat of Israeli violence in order to justify its weapons.
When pressure comes down on Hizballah to disarm, it will attempt to bait and provoke Israel into attacking, allowing it to claim that its arms are needed to defend from “Zionist aggression.” This cycle seems to be playing well with Hizballah’s constituency.
Israel, focused on the military battlefield, will probably respond to provocation, especially if it comes in the form of more rocket attacks (most recently August 13 ) or blatant attempts by Hizballah to rearm. Hizballah, fighting a PR war, will revel in portraying the continuing Israeli attacks as proof that both it and its weapons are necessary to defend Lebanon from an irrational, bellicose neighbor.
Into these disastrous two wars comes the Lebanese military. Israel is making optimistic sounds about this deployment, hoping that it will weaken Hizballah’s military hold over the area. Hizballah is also welcoming the deployment of the Lebanese military into the south. The Lebanese military will resist a confrontational stance vis-?-vis Hizballah, and they certainly will not attempt disarmament. Effectively, the Lebanese military will deploy to the south as guests of Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, and Hizballah will control their movements and activities. This will not be difficult, as around 50 percent of the military is Shia and likely to be supporters of Hizballah.
Hizballah will take advantage of Lebanese military humanitarian or reconstruction successes as opportunities to show that the Lebanese government is working hand-in-hand with Hizballah in order to rebuild southern Lebanon after “Zionist” aggression. In other cases, the better-organized and more disciplined Hizballah will take advantage of opportunities to show up the Lebanese military (source). If Hizballah decides to provoke Israel again, then it will make sure that the Lebanese military gets caught in the cross-fire in order to use them as political pawns and human shields in the same way it now uses the Shia civilian population.
A highly-effective UN force that is committed to wresting southern Lebanon from Hizballah and policing the borders to prevent rearmament could salvage this brewing crisis. However, the international force coming into Lebanon does not appear to be tasked with strong-arming Hizballah. So far, Nasrallah has not approved international forces, and the United Nations will probably be reluctant to put its forces in a situation that risks wide-scale military confrontation with Hizballah. The UN, like the Lebanese military, could wind up spending its time in southern Lebanon as guests of the Sheikh.
