As Iraq careens toward open sectarian civil war and the sectarian communal identity and power groupings assert their primacy over that of the government, restless calls from Shia leaders for communal autonomy have grown (August 9, 2006 WAR Report). These dynamics underscore the importance of Moqtada al-Sadr?a rebel-turned-key national political figure and the populist leader of large segments of Iraq’s Shia community and the powerful Shia rebel militia, the Mahdi Army –in potentially tempering the militant sectarianism from the Shia camp or, conversely, serving as a vanguard leader within an autonomous Shia territory.
Al-Sadr has succeeded in translating his early stature and street muscle as a rebel leader and defender of the Shia into legitimate political power. Sadr’s political power remains underpinned by the popular support of many Shia and, now less brazenly, by his continued control of segments of the Mahdi Army, which many Shia view as the best defense force against Sunni militants. However, recent reports have indicated that the Mahdi Army is fragmenting and that elements are not under al-Sadr’s control. Some of the more extremist Mahdi leaders seem to be rejecting al-Sadr’s increased cooperation with the government, pursuing their own violent sectarian designs, while other street commanders jockey for dominance and autonomy. These dynamics point to the emergence of more hard-line and violent splinter militias.
The Sadr camp holds 30 of the 275 seats in the Iraqi Parliament and five Cabinet posts; Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki relies upon al-Sadr for political support. Al-Sadr has sought to entrench his political power among his Shia constituency and Iraqi society in general by diversifying his levers of power and engagement with the everyday needs of society and by having supporters appointed as heads of the ministries of transportation, health, and electricity. The evolution of Sadr’s early thuggish rebel group into a complex political-militant organization mirrors that of two preeminent guerrilla-terrorist organizations, Lebanese Hizballah (see this WAR Report) and Hamas . Indeed, al-Sadr may be modeling his communal grouping after Hizballah. Al-Sadr and his constituency have demonstrated solidarity with Hizballah in rallies in Baghdad.
Shia militia “death squads”, and in particular Mahdi Army elements, are primary actors in the spiral of sectarian killings. This noteriety has drawn the interest of Coalition and Iraq forces as part of both stepped up counter-militia operations targeting militia leaders and of a broader “ink blot” counterinsurgency campaign (August 2, 2006 WAR Report) aimed at pacifying Baghdad. US and Iraqi government forces have sought to avoid large-scale confrontations with the Mahdi Army core that in turn would galvanize al-Sadr’s supporters against the government and the US and scuttle al-Maliki’s peace and reconciliation efforts. Instead, Coalition and Iraqi forces have targeted the more uncontrollable extremist Mahdi elements that al-Sadr is unlikely to defend. As a result, Coalition and Iraqi forces may seek to craft a “carrot and stick,” political-militant strategy for pacifying and demobilizing the Mahdi militia. This strategy entail conducting discrete, but robust, raids against the more extremist elements of the Mahdi Army while seeking to engage and entice al-Sadr into reining in, demobilizing, and/or integrating his fighters into the national security forces in return for greater political power.
However, if the sectarian conflict and ethnic cleansing that has set Iraq on a path toward civil war and the rending of Iraq into ethno-religiously-defined sectarian power groupings and territory proves unbreakable and/or Coalition and Iraqi forces strike too forcefully at al-Sadr’s militia power base, his Shia constituency and the Mahdi Army may flex their collective muscle and prove to be the nucleus of Shia communal autonomy. Indeed, the Sadrist rally may indicate a growing sense of Shia nationalist rebellion, emboldened by the exploits of Hizballah. In either future, Sadr, his Mahdi Army, his political representatives, and his vast Shia constituency will likely represent a pivotal power grouping.
