As noted in these pages, the machinery of civil war in Iraq (Country Report) is in motion. This process is driven by both an accelerating and brazen spiral of sectarian killings and the forced displacement of rival minorities from mixed areas in what appears to be the early stages of ethnic-cleansing and growing embrace by Iraqis of sectarian identities, interests, and communal faculties as the primary source of basic needs of everyday life, specifically security, superseding a reliance on the government. These dynamics have laid bare the underlying musculature of identity and power groupings of the corpus of Iraq, political officials serving their ethnic-religious constituencies, underpinned by political and communal sectarian militias, and pursuing sectarian communal interests and futures. The flexing of this musculature has underscored an eroding confidence in and a commitment to the prospects of a civic nationalist identity and nation-state project. These dynamics have set Iraq on a course toward a bloody convulsion of sectarian conflict, civil war, and demographic tectonic shifts that may rend and reorganize Iraqi society into de facto ethno-religiously-defined provinces and enclaves.
Departing British Ambassador to Iraq, William Patey, echoing long-held assessments in these pages, reported in a cable to London: “The prospect of a low intensity civil war and a de facto division of Iraq is probably more likely at this stage than a successful and substantial transition to a stable democracy.” Head of US Central Command, General John Abizaid, said in recent congressional testimony that, “I believe that the sectarian violence is probably as bad as I’ve seen it, in Baghdad in particular, and that if not stopped, it is possible that Iraq could move towards civil war.”
As sectarian attacks have increased, so too has the pace and volume of Iraqi refugees fleeing the fighting, many forced by sectarian violence, exacting a form of ethnic cleansing and consolidation of sectarian-defined territory. The resulting demographic layout places the Kurds in the north, Shia in the south, and the Sunnis in the center and west. Indeed, provincial autonomy is attractive to both the Kurds and the Shia, as both would occupy territory rich in oil resources. In language supporting autonomy for the Shia, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Shia Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, recently called for the establishment of communal militias–people’s committees–to defend their communities and take greater responsibility for their security and, as quoted by the Washington Post, said “that the ‘experience of Kurdistan’–a largely autonomous region in northern Iraq–‘is a pioneering experience’ and that ‘a serious movement should be made in that direction.'” As Dexter Filkins of the New York Times has reported, the heavily mixed sectarian cities of Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Mosul will likely be the violent epicenters of sectarian societal tectonics.
As Iraqis abandon the nation-state project and focus on sectarian communal identity and security and as prospects dim for arresting the fragmentation of Iraq, the increasingly likely outcome will be sectarian provinces and enclaves. The dynamics driving Iraq to this outcome may be prevented on a number of security and political fronts:
in breaking the cycle of sectarian conflict with a saturation of Iraqi and US security forces in flashpoint cities;
-galvanizing a broad-based commitment among Iraqis and their politicians to the national project and the reconciliation plan of the -al-Maliki government; and
-demonstrating the benefits and prospects of ‘national’ initiatives via improvements in basic government services to provide unprejudiced security and prosperity.
However, should sectarian fighting run its course and create sectarian provinces, the international community may seek to interpose forces between rival sectarian territories in an effort to staunch violence and salvage as much stability and security as possible.
Ethno-religiously-defined provinces may provide the conditions to slow the momentum of sectarian strife, to work toward a confederation of provinces to maintain territorial stability and to degrade, demobilize, and integrate the most dangerous and destabilizing sectarian militias into the provincial defense forces, governing structure, and society.