NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took command of troops in the Taliban stronghold of southern Afghanistan and has faced stepped up insurgent attacks. The NATO commander, Lt Gen David Richards, will head a force of 18,000 and will deploy roughly twice as many troops into the south than the US had. His recent comments suggest that his forces will shift tactics from its US predecessors and employ a more holistic ‘ink blot’ counterinsurgency strategy, similar to the strategy intended to be employed by US and Iraqi forces to pacify Baghdad . This strategy should prove advantageous in unseating the Taliban and other militant elements from their southern strongholds, winning over local hearts and minds, and creating an environment in which Kabul can extend its writ.
During their deployment, US forces reportedly focused largely on counterterrorism operations, hunting Taliban and al-Qaeda elements and Osama bin Laden and his coterie, with little emphasis given to reconstruction and winning the hearts and minds of Afghans in the contested provinces that are now Taliban strongholds. Richards plans to do things differently. NATO forces will establish secure zones–the ink blot–that provide the beachheads into the anarchic insurgent landscape of the contested provinces, providing sanctuaries in which reconstruction and development aid initiatives can take hold. The strategy seeks to provide security and prosperity for the local Afghans left alienated and unprotected by the central government.
The lack of government presence, the corruption of provincial leaders, and the presence of a kaleidoscopic array of militant actors has produced a quasi-anarchic and permissive environment for insurgents. It is an environment in which the Taliban has been able to ride roughshod over the populace, set up shadow civic administration, establish a degree of security, and win over, cajole, and coerce locals into at least a cowed tolerance, if not active support of the Taliban as the primary arbiters of security and governance. By consolidating control over territory and townships in the south and by making expansionist incursions into towns closer to the ‘front’ with Coalition forces, the Taliban is positioned to exploit the base of local support for operational gains: societal camouflage and networks for clandestine basing, operations, and smuggling and for intelligence on government and Coalition forces.
As TRC has argued, it remains critical that counterinsurgency strategies seek to root out and cleave the Taliban, drug lords, and other criminal actors from any base of societal support. The ‘ink blot’ counterinsurgency strategy should prove advantageous in doing just that. By establishing security in villages and insulating the populace from the menace and intimidation of the Taliban and other militant groups, the government and Coalition forces can create a safehaven in which the Kabul government’s durable security and reconstruction infrastructure can begin to take hold, winning the people to support, aid, and participate in these government agencies.
Further, NATO counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations must seek not only to degrade the direct militant threat of drug lords but also to erode both their support of the anarchic environment in which the militant groups thrive and the strength of the Taliban. Richards noted this dimension of the counterinsurgency fight: “The opium trade is being threatened by the NATO expansion into the south and they are going to fight very hard to keep what they have got.” Indeed, NATO forces can expect a fight, as the Taliban and drug runners are not likely to yield ground, and they will likely seek to land body blows against NATO forces to set them on their heels before they have time to dig in and project power.