The proliferation and catalytic role of militias in driving the spiral of sectarian conflict in Iraq has compelled a renewed focus among US forces on countermilitia operations. However, the lack of capable countermilitia forces loyal exclusively to the government and a government with questionable political will to confront sectarian militias forcefully will likely jeopardize the countermilitia strategy and may, in turn, reinforce support for them.
In addition to the more aggressive sectarian militias accused of death squad activity?largely Shia militias and specifically Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and the Shia Badr Organization?other militias have emerged as communal defense forces in response to the militias’ sectarian menace. Indeed, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of Iraq’s most powerful political party, the Shia Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, recently called for the establishment of additional communal militias (people’s committees) to defend their communities and take greater responsibility for their security.
In an effort to staunch the spiral of sectarian attacks, the US military stepped-up its countermilitia raids in Baghdad, reportedly launching 19 raids and netting eight cell leaders and 37 cell members, all of whom refused to name their affiliations. Further, the Bush administration announced that additional US forces will be redeployed to Baghdad to bolster counterinsurgency operations alongside Iraqi forces and to pacify the capital following the failed security clampdown implemented in recent weeks by the al-Maliki government. According to Michael Gordon of the New York Times, a version of the so-called “ink blot” counterinsurgency strategy will be employed against the militias and insurgents with forces focused on seizing, clearing, and securing neighborhoods to create sanctuaries where Iraqi government police and reconstruction efforts can take hold. The strategy is advantageous in theory, as it seeks to cleave the militias and insurgents from their base of societal support, shrink their areas of operation, confront and degrade the militias and insurgents, and provide sanctuaries in which government security forces and public works can begin to build confidence in the government’s ability to provide a safer and more prosperous future than that offered by sectarianism and militias.
While degrading the most aggressive militias from intersectarian incursions is a critical element of successful countermilitia operations, so too are the needs to sap popular communal support for the militias and erode militia ranks by drawing fighters into demobilization and reintegration processes (for a more in-depth discussion of countermilitia strategy see the April 26 WAR Report). Thus, an imperative condition for the success of this strategy is that the Iraqi government forces demonstrate a robust, resolute, and unprejudiced ability to impose unprejudiced security for the warring sectarian communities. Providing security through government actions as an alternative to militia protection will erode the perceived raison d’etre and popular support for militias as communal defenders. However, the Iraqi government and its security forces are unlikely to have the martial faculties or political will to prosecute countermilitia operations against their political party street muscle, allies, or communal defenders. This raises the potential that the countermilitia strategy will be prosecuted inconsistently, allowing for continued areas of operation for militias, continued sectarian conflict, and a reinforced perception of support for the militias’ existance as the only viable source of communal and sectarian defense. Further, with the influx of US and Iraqi troops and police into Baghdad and the more forceful confrontation with militias as part of stepped up countermilitia raids and the “ink blot” strategy, an upsurge of violent confrontations can be expected in the near-term as the most powerful militias will likely not give up their strongholds without a fight.
