Terrorist violence launched from Gaza and Lebanon directly attacks the end goal of Israel’s convergence plan: security for the Israeli citizenry through unilateral withdrawals from Occupied Territories. To regain public confidence in the plan, the Israeli government is determined to demonstrate that its military force can remove or at least deter external threats, thereby protecting the end goal of a newly defined nation-state.
The success of Palestinian terrorist groups and Hezbollah in launching cross-border raids and firing rockets into Israeli towns is the death knell for the convergence policy. The inability of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to rout either perpetrator will compound public insecurity and further erode confidence in convergence as a viable option.
CONVERGENCE POLICY
The convergence plan calls for Israel’s unilateral disengagement from the West Bank, roughly along the contours of the partially constructed security fence. The policy of unilateral withdrawals stems from two assumptions:
1. Israel must condense its territory and population to maintain the Jewish character of the state;
2. negotiations are futile, as a viable Palestinian peace partner does not exist .
To implement the convergence plan, Israel cannot tolerate terrorist acts within its pre-1967 internationally recognized borders. The Israeli government must assure the public that territorial retreat will not endanger the state. To this end, the IDF is tasked with reasserting military deterrence in the immediate region.
While the Israeli public shared the government’s assessments, their support for convergence dwindled as terrorist groups in Gaza fired daily barrages of rockets into southern Israel. The prospect of ceding the West Bank, which is closer than Gaza to major Israeli population centers, is now a losing political issue.
Indeed, the crises in Lebanon and Gaza validated domestic political criticism of convergence. Israeli conservatives point to the ascending political trajectories of Hezbollah and Hamas as evidence that conceding territory without receiving concessions in return emboldens and empowers radical elements. Liberal opponents of convergence share this assessment and add that enforcing unilateral measures undercuts the moderate sector and leadership within Palestinian society still willing to negotiate. The weakened stature of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, whose legitimacy stems from his capacity to negotiate with Israel and the West, supports this contention.
ISRAEL’S MILITARY RESPONSE
The success of convergence hinges on the Israeli ability to deter direct attacks militarily. Hence, the Israeli government interpreted the attacks into Israel as more significant than those perpetrated on Occupied Territory. In reference to the Israeli destructive military campaign against Hezbollah, a close ministerial ally of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated, “We are fighting so that when we withdraw from future territories, they will remember Lebanon” (source).
LIMITS OF MILITARY POWER
The failure of the Israeli military to readjust the security situation fundamentally along its border with Gaza and Lebanon will sink the convergence plan. Despite repeated incursions into Gaza and the shelling of ministry buildings and infrastructure, Israel has not obtained the release of its kidnapped soldier , nor prevented Qassam rockets from being fired into Israel. Likewise, Hezbollah is holding two IDF soldiers hostage and appears to be weathering the fierce Israeli bombardment of Lebanon. Hezbollah has continued to launch rockets into Israeli cities; has managed to virtually shut down northern Israel; and has seen anger unite Lebanon and bolster support for the group.
The identity of Israel’s governing party?Kadima?is tied directly to the success of the convergence plan. Moving forward, the critical questions for Israeli leadership are whether they can reassess assumptions, divorce themselves from unilateral withdrawals, and present an alternate vision for the future.
